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This paper encourages Expressivists to abandon a traditional content-
centric approach to semantic theorizing, in favor of an update-centric or
dynamic approach.
It first develops an argument against traditional content-centric Ex-
pressivism, akin in many respects to Schroeder (2008a,b,c). Content Ex-
pressivists, I claim, are hard-pressed to avail themselves of a key tool
in semantic theorizing: the use of disquotation to generate Boolean inter-
pretations of object-language connectives. I identify two aspects of this
problem. First, empirical: disquotation generates the wrong meanings
in a class of cases. Second, structural: the modes of semantic expla-
nation that disquotation affords look as if they are just unavailable to
Expressivists. The Frege-Geach and Negation/Disagreement Problems
for Expressivism are, I argue, versions of this more general problem.
The paper also outlines a way Expressivists can handle these diffi-
culties. The Expressivist’s empirical difficulties are solvable by appeal
to the sorts of non-classical approaches to negation, disjunction, and
so on, familiar from linguistic work in Dynamic Semantics. Her treat-
ments of such connectives will not, therefore, be Boolean, in the usual
sense of that notion, but that is not, I will suggest, fairly regarded as
a cost. Her structural difficulties with disquotation are more serious:
they raise a worry about whether semantic explanation as traditionally
conceived — i.e., explanation of object-language meaning phenomena
by appeal to facts in the model theory — is in any familiar sense possi-
ble for the Expressivist. Here I suggest that the Expressivist move away
from a model theory that makes central use of attitude-individuating
contents, toward a model theory that makes central use of updates or
constraints on abstract or formal representations of states of mind (un-
derstood as familiar set-theoretic constructions out of possibilia). Pro-
vided the advice is heeded, Expressivists can offer explanations of a
surprisingly wide array of semantic phenomena that perform well ac-
cording to canonical standards in model-theoretic semantics.
In §2, I sketch how an Expressivist semantics for a certain kind
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of language is motivated, and I describe Gibbard’s standard content-
centric way of pursuing it. In §3, I explain why a semantics in this vein
runs into the sorts of difficulties mentioned above. In §4, I describe a
different kind of Expressivist-friendly semantics, drawing inspiration
from influential work on epistemic modals from the Dynamic Seman-
tic tradition and on disjunction from the Alternative/Inquisitive Se-
mantics tradition. Although most of the work here is in making an
Expressivist-friendly semantic machinery perform at the same level
as standard truth-conditional machinery, there are one or two points
where this machinery may have an empirical leg up on the competition.
Finally, in §5, I respond to an obvious charge — that Expressivists are
not entitled to make use of the semantics of §4. Perhaps there is a rea-
son no Expressivist semantics on the market looks like the one I give,
namely, that it — a dynamic alternative semantics that makes central
use of set-theoretic constructions out of possibilia and no (direct) use
of mental states — is ruled out by the basic commitments Expressivists
have themselves articulated. That charge is mistaken, I argue. Expres-
sivists can make use of a semantics of possibilia (with all of its ex-
planatory power) so long as mental states remain fundamental. I go on
to describe the sense in which mental states might be fundamental for
an Expressivist who makes use of my semantics.
2. Motivation
There are Expressivists (or something close enough) about many kinds
of language: normative claims (Gibbard, 1990, 2003), epistemic modals
(Yalcin, 2007, 2011, 2012; Swanson, forthcoming), conditionals (Adams,
1975; Gibbard, 1981; Bennett, 2003), probability claims (Barker, 2006;
Yalcin, 2012; Swanson, forthcoming), knowledge claims (Chrisman,
2007, 2012a; Ridge, 2007), and more besides. To get a general view,
start with the following fairly representative remark:
[A] story is recognizably expressivist in being guided by an inde-
pendently motivated conception of the states of mind involved in
accepting sentences of the target fragment, in claiming that assertions
of sentences of the target fragment canonically serve to express states
of mind not equivalent to full belief in propositions, and in being a
development of the idea that sentences of the target fragment are
not straightforwardly factual. (Yalcin 2012: 125)
Let us unpack this. First, Expressivists are “guided by an indepen-
dently motivated conception of the states of mind involved in accept-
ing sentences of the target fragment”. Call sentences of the target frag-
ment E-sentences. Expressivist theorizing about the meaning of an E-
sentence φ privileges, in a sense to be precisified, the state of mind
constitutively involved in accepting (or, perhaps, uttering) φ; that state
of mind is taken to be somehow fundamental in thinking about the
meaning of φ. In Gibbard’s well-known formulation, we “explain the
meaning of a term” in such a fragment by explaining “what states
of mind the term is used to express” (2003, 5–6). In Wedgwood’s for-
mulation, “the fundamental explanation of the meaning of normative
statements, and the sentences that are used to make those statements,
is given in terms of the type of mental state that the statements made
by uttering those sentences express” (2007, 35). Expressivists embrace
a distinctive view of the methodology and subject-matter of seman-
tic theorizing. It thus seems appropriate to label this the distinctive
metasemantic commitment of Expressivism.
Second, “assertions of sentences of the target fragment canoni-
cally serve to express states of mind not equivalent to full belief in
propositions”. Call a state of mind representational iff it is equivalent
to full belief in a propositional content,1 and say that a sentence φ
1 By propositional content, I will mean something fairly loaded, namely: a rep-
resentational content. A representational content is an entity encoding what I
will term a locational perspective: a property an agent can self-ascribe by way
of self-locating in modal space (understood as a space of possible worlds
or possibly more fine-grained entities) (cf. Lewis, 1979a). The mental state-
type of self-location is functionally distinguished from motivational state-
types like preference or desire, as well as from broadly representational
state-types that nevertheless cannot be propositionally individuated (e.g., as-
signing p a credence of .5 conditional on q). In the above paragraph, then, I
am understanding Expressivism’s metasemantic commitments as precluding
the assignment of representational contents as the semantic values of sen-
tences with a non-representational function. There is a more general sense
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has a representational function iff it canonically serves to express2 a
representational state of mind (and a non-representational function iff
it canonically serves to express a nonrepresentational state of mind).
According to Expressivism’s central metasemantic commitment, a se-
mantics for φ must at least account for the state of mind φ canonically
serves to express. Thus, if φ has a non-representational function, it
cannot have a propositional semantics; a propositional semantics is fit
for accounting for a representational function, but not, I have assumed,
for accounting for a non-representational function. Simplified:
a. The function of φ is non-representational
b. If φ meant a proposition, its function would be representational
c. So φ does not mean a proposition
Let us refer to (a) as the empirical claim of Expressivism; (b) is
a consequence of Expressivism’s distinctive metasemantic commit-
ments; (a) and (b) together yield a commitment to a nonpropositional
semantics for φ, which I will call the semantic claim of Expressivism.3
of ‘proposition’ — namely, content that can “bear” truth-values and serve as
the object of an attitude-type we might neutrally term ‘acceptance’ — which
admits both representational and non-representational varieties and which
Expressivists, therefore, might countenance (see esp. Schroeder, 2011c). In-
deed, an Expressivism that assigned non-representational “propositional”
contents as semantic values for E-sentences would be one way of develop-
ing the content-centric Expressivism that is the target of this essay. However,
if this essay’s main negative argument is right, then it is simply Expressivists’
use of contents as semantic values that gets them into trouble. The negative
argument nowhere makes use of the assumption that the contents assigned
by a content-centric Expressivism are non-“propositional”; it assumes only
that these contents are, of necessity, non-representational. Hence, an Expres-
sivism that assigns non-representational (possibly “propositional”) contents
as semantic values should be abandoned for one that assigns updates (or,
generally, things determining cognitive instructions) as semantic values.
2 Complications arise in saying what expression amounts to. See Schroeder
(2008b) and discussion in §5.
3 It is worth noting that Expressivism is not expected to be empirically visible
in a semantics for representational language.
Evidence for the empirical claims that motivate Expressivism can
take various forms. Often such evidence involves claims about what it
is to be in a state of mind like:
(1) Thinking murder is wrong
(2) Thinking it might be raining
(3) Thinking it’s likely that the keys are on the table
(4) Thinking Pete won if he called
No surprise, then, that the argument from motivational internalism
— according to which, roughly, normative attitudes like (1) are non-
representational attitudes (because, were they representational, they
would not thereby motivate an agent possessing them, as normative
judgments apparently do) — figures prominently in arguments for Ex-
pressivism about normative judgments (see, e.g., Gibbard, 1990; Smith,
1994). Expressivism about epistemic modals, judgments of probability,
and conditionals is often motivated by appeal to standard Bayesian un-
derstandings of attitudes like (2)–(4), on which such attitudes involve,
respectively, being representable with a probability function or infor-
mation state that is compatible with the proposition that it is raining,
that assigns high credence to the proposition that the keys are on the
table, and that assigns credence near 1 to the proposition that Pete won
conditional on Pete calling. (None of these states is equivalent to a rep-
resentational — i.e., propositionally individuable — state of mind.)
It is natural to envision a semantics for an E-sentence φ being
reverse-engineered from an independently motivated picture of φ’s
characteristic function: we assign a meaning well-suited to explaining
φ’s characteristic function (and code up this meaning in an appropriate
formal metalanguage). There are three steps to separate out here (each
with a distinctive body of terminology, concerns, methodology):
a. Functional. Isolate φ’s characteristic function
b. Meaning. Identify a meaning M(φ) for φ such that M(φ) can ex-
plain φ’s function
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c. Semantic. “Code up” M(φ) in a semantic denotation for φ, JφK
We first isolate φ’s characteristic function by isolating the state of
mind it canonically expresses. Given an Expressivist metasemantics,
this state of mind is fundamental in understanding φ’s meaning; φ’s
meaning is a matter of the state of mind it expresses. This state of mind
is exploited in assigning a semantic denotation for φ that is suited to
explaining various semantic features: why φ is inconsistent with ¬φ,
for example.
Expressivists have tended to run these steps together; indeed, this
is a very natural thing for them to do, given the extraordinarily central
role that Expressivists give notions like function and expression in the
theory of meaning. As Gideon Rosen notes in a representative com-
ment, “The centerpiece of any quasi-realist ‘account’ is what I shall
call a psychologistic semantics for the region: a mapping from state-
ments in the area to the mental states they ‘express’ when uttered
sincerely” (1998: 387). Clearly, on Rosen’s understanding of Expres-
sivism (his “quasi-realism”) there is no bright line between the theory
of φ’s meaning, the theory of φ’s function, and the theory of φ’s se-
mantic value. This might seem a natural extension of the idea that, for
the Expressivist, the functional realm is explanatorily fundamental in
the theory of meaning (in the way that, say, reductive physicalism is
to many philosophers a natural result of adopting a metaphysics on
which physics is ontologically and explanatorily fundamental).
As an illustration, consider Gibbard (1990, 2003). For Gibbard, the
semantic content of any atomic normative sentence is represented as
a set of pairings of “Hyperplans” and worlds. (A Hyperplan is a plan
that, for each contingency w and action α, either forbids α at w or
permits, in the rough sense of forbids forbidding, α at w, but does not
do both; see Gibbard 2003, 56.) Call such a set a Gibbard Content. The
Gibbard Content of ‘murder is wrong’ is the set of pairs 〈pi, w〉 such
that the sentence ‘according to pi, murder is forbidden’ is true at w.
At first glance, Gibbard seems not to assign mental states as the
meanings of normative sentences (Gibbard Contents being the sort
of set-theoretic constructions familiar from model-theoretic semantics).
For Gibbard, however, sets of Hyperplan-world pairs function as repre-
sentations of states of mind (cf. Schroeder, 2008c; Dreier, 2006). In the rep-
resentation of states of mind with planning content, Hyperplans play a
role analogous to that played by possible worlds in the representation
of belief. (So, as the beliefs of someone who is uncertain about p are
often represented with a set of worlds, some of which satisfy p, some
of which satisfy ¬p, the practical state of mind of someone who is un-
certain about whether to do some action in some contingency can be
represented with a set of Hyperplans.)
Gibbard Contents allow the usual Boolean treatment of the con-
nectives: ∧ is associated with ∩, ¬ with ′, etc. Gibbard, however, is
explicit that this Boolean representation is just that: a representation
of a more fundamental psychological reality, chosen for (i) its formal
properties (i.e., its treatment of contents as elements of a Booelan alge-
bra and connectives as Boolean operations) and (ii) its suitability as a
representation of the semantically interesting properties of that reality.
He writes: “One way to think of fact-plan content is to mimic truth
functions and quantification...These [mental] operations — combining,
ruling out, generalizing — mimic standard logical operations on state-
ments: conjunction, negation, and universal generalization” (2003, 54).
3. Problems for Expressivism
Expressivists about an E-sentence φ blend an empirical claim about
φ’s function (that it is non-representational) with a metasemantic
claim (that propositions are unfit meanings for sentences with non-
representational functions) to yield a conclusion about φ’s semantics
(that it does not mean a proposition). Objections to Expressivism have
not tended to focus directly on its metasemantic program (and thus
tend to have only an indirect bearing on its metasemantic commit-
ments). Instead, they have tended to fall into one of the following piles:
Empirical. Argue that φ’s function is representational (using var-
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ious data from, e.g., epistemology and moral psychology4)
Semantic. Bracket the question of φ’s function, argue directly
against the Expressivist semantics
I will not address worries of the first sort here. My sense is that
the Expressivist account of the function of normative language and
judgment tends to be regarded as a relative strength of the view.
(I expect this holds even more for Bayesian versions of Expres-
sivism.) Further, the most prominent worries about Expressivism
(e.g. the Frege-Geach Problem) have little to do with its Empirical
commitments, and very much to do with its Semantic commitments.5
The central observation that motivates the semantic critique of Ex-
pressivism is that sentences of type E tend to embed relatively freely in
environments normally taken to require propositional arguments, e.g.,
under connectives and attitude verbs and in indicative conditionals.
(5) Bob should put up, or he should shut up
(6) Mary thinks it might be raining
(7) Mary thinks Pete won if he called
(8) If it is likely to rain, you should bring an umbrella
4 Dorr (2002) gives, in this sense, an “Empirical” objection in the epistemolog-
ical vein. For discussion, see Enoch (2003); Lenman (2003); Budolfson (2011);
Schroeder (2011b); Mabrito (2013). The “Moral Attitude Problem” — i.e., the
problem of identifying a psychologically appropriate non-representational
state of mind that might be expressed by moral claims — is an “Empirical”
objection in the moral psychological vein. For discussion, see Köhler (2013).
Thanks here to Matthew Chrisman.
5 Worries of this sort might seem problematic on their face. For they mean
denying Expressivism’s (a) empirical and (b) metasemantic commitments,
on apparently a priori grounds. Regarding (a): it simply seems wrong to
approach the question of a sentence’s conventional function in such an a
priori way. As for (b): we normally allow that non-representational function
implies non-propositional meaning (in the case of, e.g., interrogatives and
imperatives). Thus, if we take the Expressivist’s claim about the function of
the relevant fragment at face-value, Frege-Geach objections seem to miss the
point. I think there is probably something to these trains of thought, but I do
not want to assume so here.
Expressivists of course require a theory of the meaning of such embed-
dings that is compositional: the meaning of the whole must be a function
of the meanings of its constituents.6 Here I will present a simple ver-
sion of the challenge of compositionality that seems to me to have been
influential in this debate, as well as an influential type of solution.7
The basic worry: if Expressivism about some kind of E-sentence is
true, compositionality will require a modification of the standard truth-
conditional semantics for sentences whose function is representational.
How, after all, could meanings of such different kinds (propositions
and, roughly, states of mind) for sentences with such similar syntactic
profiles co-exist in a single semantic theory? Consider:
(9) Bob stole a book from the library, but he shouldn’t have
(10) It is overcast, but it may not be raining
(11) Pete has a good hand, and he won if he called
It is linguistic orthodoxy that coordinating conjunctions (and, but, etc.)
join constituents of the same semantic type τ, to yield a complex con-
stituent of type τ (Partee and Rooth, 1983).8 So the default position for
Expressivism — that E-sentences mean, roughly, states of mind, while
6 Traditional versions of the Frege-Geach Problem (Geach, 1965; Searle, 1962)
have it that such a theory is impossible, since E-sentences embedded in
unasserted environments cannot express, in the ordinary sense of that no-
tion, the attitudes that Expressivists take to be their meanings (hence cannot
contribute to the meanings of such environments). For why this is mistaken,
see, e.g., Schroeder (2008d).
7 There will be much to dislike about the way the challenge is put, as well as
the solution I present. My only aim here is to reconstruct a relatively “early”
stage of the dialectic.
8 There are purported counterexamples to Partee and Rooth’s generalization
(e.g., coordination between definite noun phrases, often thought to denote
individuals, and quantifier phrases, often thought to denote sets of proper-
ties). Coordination between definite NPs and QPs is generally handled by
assuming that definite NPs have the same semantic type as QPs (Montague,
1973), or that, for purposes of computing the conjunction’s semantic value,
the semantic value of the definite NP undergoes a type-shifting operation
(type raising) so that the semantic value of its node is of the same type as the
semantic value of the QP (cf. Partee and Rooth, 1983).
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ordinary declaratives mean propositions — seems untenable. Expres-
sivists are committed to rewriting all of semantics — i.e., semantics for
E-sentences and non-E-sentences alike — from the ground up.9
How serious is this problem? Ultimately, not very. Partee and Rooth
famously provide a recipe for generating the meaning of a conjunction
with conjuncts of any semantic type, propositional or otherwise (so
long as the conjuncts are of the same semantic type). The official story
is complicated, but the driving idea is not: so long as the semantic
values of two coordinated items are (or are isomorphic to) sets of en-
tities of the same type, we can think of the semantic value of their
conjunction as the intersection of these two sets. (So, for example, the se-
mantic value of a transitive verb like hit is usually typed as a relation
between individuals, or a function from pairs of individuals to truth-
values. The semantic value of the conjunction of two transitive verbs
V1 and V2, JV1 and V2K, is also typed as a relation between individuals
— the relation mapping a pair of individuals to true just if the pair is
mapped to true by JV1K and JV2K.)
To handle coordination using this sort of generalized semantics for
conjunction, the Expressivist needs only to treat E-sentences and non-
E-sentences as denoting sets of entities of the same type. Sets of what? Fo-
cus for a moment on the case of normative language. Gibbard’s answer
here is clear: sets of pairs of worlds and Hyperplans. All sentences,
notice, have satisfaction conditions relative to such pairs: descriptive
sentences are satisfied at a world in the usual way (so that the Hyper-
plan plays no role), whereas the satisfaction conditions for normative
sentences make essential reference to a Hyperplan.
Normative Satisfaction, Base Cases
1. 〈w,pi〉 |= p iff w(p) = 1
9 For a similar take, see Schroeder (2008a). Similar points hold for disjunc-
tions. Conditionals are more complicated, since they do not generally re-
quire antecedent and consequent to be of the same semantic type. Witness
conditional questions (Isaacs and Rawlins, 2008) and conditional imperatives
(Schwager, 2007; Kaufmann and Schwager, 2011; Charlow, 2014a,b).
2. 〈w,pi〉 |= ought(p) iff ∀v ∈ pi : v(p) = 1
A condition of the form 〈w,pi〉 |= S is dubbed a satisfaction condition,
paraphrasable, for Gibbard, roughly, as: ‘according to pi, S’ is true at w.
When S is descriptive, the ‘according to pi’ adjunct is vacuous, and so
〈w,pi〉 |= S iff S is true at w. In other words, when S is descriptive, S has
its ordinary “possible worlds” truth condition. We suppose a simple
story on which 〈w,pi〉 |= ought(p) iff the “sphere of permissibility”
characterized by pi at w10 entails p (cf. Lewis, 1979b; Yalcin, 2012). Thus,
‘according to pi, ought(p)’ is true at w iff the “sphere of permissibility”
characterized by pi at w entails p.
For conjunction, the strategy is clear: a conjunction denotes a rela-
tion mapping a world-Hyperplan pair to 1 (i.e., satisfaction) just if the
pair is mapped to true by each conjunct. Likewise, we may suppose,
for the remainder of the connectives.
Normative Satisfaction, Inductive Cases
1. 〈w,pi〉 |= ¬φ iff not: 〈w,pi〉 |= φ
2. 〈w,pi〉 |= φ ∧ ψ iff 〈w,pi〉 |= φ and 〈w,pi〉 |= ψ
3. 〈w,pi〉 |= φ ∨ ψ iff 〈w,pi〉 |= φ or 〈w,pi〉 |= ψ
It is striking to notice that — save for the appearance of Hyperplans
in the semantics — this is exactly how a classical, propositional seman-
tics for these connectives would look. In particular, the semantics for
complex sentences is disquotational, in the following sense:
Definition 1. A semantic theory T for the connectives of a language L,
with fundamental semantic relation RT between sentences of L and model-
theoretic objects x, is disquotational iff the inductive definition of RT meets
the following conditions:
10The easiest way for a Hyperplan pi to characterize such a sphere would be to
take pi as a special kind of ordering source and, making the Limit Assump-
tion, use pi to construct a domain of possibilities that cannot be improved on
according to the ordering characterized by pi. Relevant formal details are in
Kratzer (1981). On this idea’s limitations, see Charlow (forthcoming).
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1. RT(¬φ, x) iff ¬RT(φ, x)
2. RT(φ ∧ ψ, x) iff RT(φ, x) ∧ RT(ψ, x)
3. RT(φ ∨ ψ, x) iff RT(φ, x) ∨ RT(ψ, x)
4. RT(φ→ ψ, x) iff RT(φ, x)→ RT(ψ, x)
Far from having to rewrite semantics from the ground up, it seems the
Expressivist can think about the meaning of environments that embed
normative sentences in a largely standard way.
This strategy readily generalizes to other forms of Expressivism.
For, e.g., Expressivists about epistemic modals, an epistemic possibil-
ity modal expresses a non-representational attitude: a condition on a
belief state that does not reduce to belief in a proposition, namely, the
condition of the prejacent not being ruled out by one’s information.
The satisfaction conditions for epistemic possibility modals thus make
essential reference to an information state — for our purposes, a set σ
of possible worlds.
Epistemic Satisfaction, Base Cases
1. 〈w, σ〉 |= p iff w(p) = 1
2. 〈w, σ〉 |= might(p) iff ∃v ∈ σ : v(p) = 1
As before, 〈w, σ〉 |= might(p) iff ‘according to σ, might(p)’ is true at w
iff σ is compatible with p. (The inductive cases are handled simply by
switching out pi’s for σ’s.)
3.1 Content Expressivism
We have noted that the Expressivist is committed to explaining the
meaning of an E-sentence in terms of the state of mind it canonically
expresses. But a Hyperplan is obviously not such a state of mind. Sim-
ilarly, take any σ such that 〈w, σ〉 |= might(p). Such a σ is hardly the
state of mind expressed by might(p), although it might represent one
way (among others) of thinking that might(p).
In model-theoretic semantics, the relationship between the entities
relative to which sentences are evaluated for satisfaction (e.g., possible
worlds) and meanings is customarily taken to be ∈: the meaning of a
sentence is (or determines) a set of worlds in which that sentence is
true. Similarly, Expressivists may represent the relevant states of mind
with sets of relevant objects. For an E-sentence φ, the relevant state of
mind is picked out with {X : X |= φ}; for a normative sentence φ, the
state of mind would be represented with the set {〈w,pi〉 : 〈w,pi〉 |= φ}.
This is exactly how Gibbard Contents are constructed.
How do the entities collated in a set individuate the relevant state of
mind? A first pass: think of a condition of the form 〈w,pi〉 |= ought(p)
as representing a particular kind of agent’s acceptance of the sen-
tence ought(p). What kind of agent? One whose plan for contingency
w is representable with Hyperplan pi: a Hyperplanner. More specifi-
cally, an agent whose contingency plan for w requires that p. Then
{〈w,pi〉 : 〈w,pi〉 |= ought(p)} represents a property such agents have
in common, namely, the property of having a plan for some relevant
contingency that requires that p.11 Let Jought(p)K be this set. To accept
ought(p) is, then, to have the attitude of acceptance toward the contentJought(p)K — for, roughly, all of the 〈w,pi〉 compatible with your state
of mind to be in Jought(p)K (where, again roughly, 〈w,pi〉 is compatible
with your state of mind just if w is compatible with how you repre-
sent the world and pi is compatible with your plans for w).12 ThusJought(p)K represents the attitude canonically expressed by ought(p).
11Note that for a “categorical” normative claim like (we will assume) ought(p),
if 〈w,pi〉 ∈ Jought(p)K then for any v, 〈v,pi〉 ∈ Jought(p)K: categorical nor-
mative claims prescribe their prejacents independent of any contingency. An-
other way of putting the point is that for categorical normative claims, the
possible worlds parameter is semantically idle. This is an idealization: how
many (if any) claims might be plausibly thought to be thoroughly world-
independent in this way?
12To deal with some concerns: first, I do not seriously assume a Hintikka-style
treatment of attitudes like acceptance; I am leaving problems like logical
omniscience to the side, to be addressed once basic ideas are laid down.
Second, perhaps there is pressure to say more fully what the state of mind
directed at this sort of content might be. (Schroeder 2008a suggests being for.) I
do not find the pressure compelling (at this stage of theorizing, anyway): so
long as the contents successfully individuate, in some fashion, the intended
states of mind, the theory is doing the job it needs to do. More on this in §5.
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Explanations in the Expressivist’s theory of meaning for ought(p) are
subsequently stated in terms of the characteristics of Jought(p)K.
These are the (rough) defining characteristics of what I term Con-
tent Expressivism about the normative. The general form of Content
Expressivism, for an E-sentence φ and entity of evaluation X, is: (i)
Let X |= φ represent acceptance of a particular kind of agent of φ; (ii)
let JφK = λX.X |= φ represent a shared characteristic of such agents:
acceptance of φ; (iii) model acceptance of φ as bearing the attitude of
acceptance toward content JφK; (iv) state semantic explanations for φ
in terms of characteristics of JφK.
Such contents function to represent states of mind. So they are prop-
erly explanatory of the phenomena in which we are interested only if
(i) they accurately represent the relevant characteristics of the states of
mind they purport to represent, (ii) the states of mind they purport
to represent are themselves explanatory of the relevant phenomena (cf.
Schroeder, 2008a). We will see reasons to doubt both (i) and (ii). It will
be handy to have names for these problems; I will unimaginatively
refer to them as problems of:
• Type 1. The content assigned by the semantic theory misrepresents
relevant characteristics of the associated state of mind
• Type 2. The associated state of mind (or content by which it is indi-
viduated) is unexplanatory of the relevant phenomenon
I will suggest ultimately that the problems here are due to an appar-
ent disanalogy with the possible worlds semantics after which the Ex-
pressivist semantics was modeled. Semantic explanations in possible
worlds semantics can be stated “at the level of” individual possible
worlds; this is where semantic explanations in possible worlds seman-
tics “bottom out”. Take the inconsistency of a world-describing sen-
tence p with its negation: p and ¬p are inconsistent because there is no
possible world w such that both p and ¬p are true at w (as I will flesh
out below). Semantic explanations in Expressivist semantics want to be
stated in a similar manner. But this creates difficulties when paired
with the broader Expressivist commitment to explain the meaning of
E-sentences by appeal to the states of mind they canonically express.
3.2 Negation
The disquotational treatment of negation sketched above has a widely
noticed problem. Notice that a negation’s attitude-individuating con-
tent is given by:
J¬φK = λX.X 6|= φ = JφK′
While a disquotational treatment of negation yields a treatment of
negation as content complementation, the resulting content — one that
collates members that fail to accept φ — does not correspond to the
state of mind we would expect to be expressed by ¬φ (Unwin, 1999,
2001; Dreier, 2006).13
(12) Not thinking giving to UNICEF is a moral duty
6∼Thinking giving to UNICEF is not a moral duty
(13) Not thinking it might be raining
6∼Thinking it can’t be raining
This is a problem of Type 1: the assigned content misrepresents the
state of mind it purports to represent. To avoid it, Expressivists may
either: (i) abandon the disquotational treatment of negation, (ii) under-
stand the objects of semantic evaluation so that their failing to accept
φ does imply their accepting ¬φ.
Content Expressivists have opted for (ii). Gibbard (2003), in partic-
ular, understands Hyperplans as complete and consistent: like possible
worlds (which lack no “opinions” about the truth of any proposition,
so that a possible world’s failing to have the opinion that p is true can
be taken to imply its having the opinion that p is false), Hyperplans
lack no opinions about the pursuit-worthiness of any course of action
13Schroeder (2011a) discusses this same problem, albeit in a different idiom.
(The worry, for him, is about the Expressivist validating an implausible prin-
ciple about attitude ascriptions — his ¬-importation.)
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in a given contingency (so that failing to view p as forbidden may be
taken to imply ruling out viewing p as forbidden, hence treating p as
permitted). Thus, the Hyperplans that fail to forbid some thing are just
the Hyperplans that actively permit that thing. Thus the complement
of Jought(φ)K is the right sort of content for representing the state of
mind of thinking that ¬ought(φ).
This response has experienced pushback (see Schroeder, 2008a,c;
Dreier, 2006, 2009). The general view, even among those sympathetic
to Expressivism, is that it is stipulative (see Yalcin, 2012; Charlow,
2014c; Silk, 2013, 2015). I will briefly characterize the problem here.
Any semantics should explain the inconsistency of a normative sen-
tence with its negation (a point that is liable to be overlooked when
the explanation is, as it tends to be, trivial). For the Content Expres-
sivist, the explanation must be given in the form of an answer to
the question: what is inconsistent about the states of mind represented
with Jought(φ)K and Jought(φ)K′? Trivially, there is no 〈w,pi〉 compat-
ible with both: Jought(φ)K ∩ Jought(φ)K′ = ∅. But the notion thatJ¬ought(φ)K = Jought(φ)K′ has a Type 1 problem — it seems to indi-
viduate the wrong state of mind — unless, for any alternative, a Hy-
perplanner either forbids or permits it (but never, on pain of ruling
ought(φ) and ¬ought(φ) consistent, both).
Why assume that Hyperplanners have this characteristic? I see two
possibilities: a Hyperplanner that forbade (e.g.) ¬φ and permitted ¬φ
would be (i) impossible, (ii) inconsistent. Option (i) is a non-starter:
such a Hyperplanner is logically, probably even psychologically, pos-
sible.14 As for (ii), what is it that makes such a Hyperplanner incon-
14Here I go contra Schroeder (2011a). He writes: “It is very plausible that neces-
sarily, if you believe that ¬P, then you don’t believe that P, and it is similarly
very plausible that necessarily, if you believe that P ∧ Q, then you believe
that P and believe that Q” (6). I cannot identify an uncontentious sense of
necessarily on which this comes out true. For conjunction, while failure to
accept φ and ψ when one accepts φ ∧ ψ is certainly a rational failure, it is
nevertheless a logical, probably even psychological, possibility. The Hyper-
planner formalism, on which it is stipulated that a Hyperplan satisfies φ ∧ ψ
iff it satisfies φ and ψ, is apparently functioning to represent a rational ideal,
sistent? But this is not meaningfully different from the question with
which we began: what is inconsistent about a state of mind — in this
case, the special state of mind associated with the relevant type of Hy-
perplanner — that forbids and permits φ’s absence? It is a question
Expressivists have so far failed to answer. To insist on the inconsis-
tency is to beg the question. It is not the sort of inconsistency involved
in representing both φ and its negation as true. Nor could it be the sort
of thing that is inconsistent about intending both φ and its negation
(see esp. Schroeder, 2008c).15
For Jought(φ)K′ to adequately represent the state of mind expressed
by ¬ought(φ), Hyperplans must be assumed to be like possible worlds:
complete and consistent. The justification for treating Hyperplans in
this way is obscure. This is a problem of Type 2. In treating the objects
of semantic evaluation like possibilia, Content Expressivists rely on
something for which their semantics is supposed to give us an account:
the inconsistency involved in accepting a sentence and its negation.
A better option is to abandon, in some fashion, the disquotational
treatment of negation (as well as the standard Boolean treatment of
content-level negation). More on this below.
but no independent account of why failing to live up to this ideal is irra-
tional is forthcoming. (The contrast with propositional content is instructive:
believing the proposition that φ ∧ ψ, but failing to believe that φ, means rep-
resenting the world as making both φ and ψ true, but failing to represent the
world as making φ true. The irrationality here is manifest.)
15Gibbard (2012, 288) reads the argument of Charlow (2011, Appendix A) (see
also Charlow 2014c) as suggesting that the theoretical standard invoked here
is artificial and overly demanding, since a similar standard could not be met
in accounting for (e.g.) the inconsistency of imperatives and contrary per-
missions. I would characterize my position differently: either the standard
is artificial, or it is genuine but can be met by a non-psychologistic Expres-
sivist account of both imperatives and normative language. I ultimately en-
dorse the latter of these alternatives. Not that Gibbard has misunderstood
me; rather, I take it that he finds the positive line I sketch in Charlow (2011,
2014c) and develop further here unappealing.
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3.3 Disjunction
The problem here is not just with negation. A similar — in fact,
more illuminating — problem arises for disjunction. The attitude-
individuating content of a disjunction is given by:
Jφ ∨ ψK = λX.X |= φ or X |= ψ = JφK∪ JψK
A disquotational treatment of disjunction yields a set-union treat-
ment of disjunction at the level of content. As before, a content built of
members that accept φ or accept ψ seems not to correspond to the state
of mind we would expect φ ∨ ψ to express. It is a mistake to conflate
acceptance of either φ or ψ (which seems to be the attitude obtained
by taking the union of JφK with JψK) with acceptance of φ ∨ ψ.16
(14) Thinking Bob should put up, or he should shut up
6∼Thinking Bob should put up or thinking Bob should shut up
(15) Thinking the keys are on the table or dresser
6∼Thinking the keys are on the table or that they are on the dresser
This seems to be a problem of Type 1: the content assigned by the
semantics seems to misrepresent relevant characteristics of attitude of
accepting a disjunction. It might seem to admit of an easy resolution.17
Consider the common representation of an agent’s information using
sets of possible worlds. Possible worlds are very opinionated objects.
For a possible world to satisfy a disjunction, it has to satisfy at least
16As before, Schroeder (2011a) discusses a version of this problem, albeit in a
different idiom. His worry is about validating an implausible principle about
the semantics of attitude ascriptions — his ∨-exportation. Ultimately, as I’ll
discuss below, the problem with disjunction I lay out here is distinct from
the version that Schroeder lays out. (Specifically, he does not challenge the
Expressivist’s use of the strategy I refer to below as IPR.)
17In fact, as I’ll discuss later in this section, the Type 1 problem admits of a
direct resolution: the Hintikkan account of the relationship between JφK and
the attitude of accepting φ discussed just above. I ask the reader to play
along while I set up the Type 2 problem for Expressivist disjunction that is
this section’s main upshot.
one disjunct: for the keys to be on the table or the dresser at w, they
must be either on the table at w, or else on the dresser at w. By the
reasoning above, apparently, a set of possible worlds should be a very
opinionated object. In particular, a set of possible worlds all of whose
members satisfy a disjunction should itself accept at least one disjunct.
The reasoning here, of course, is badly mistaken. Properties like ac-
cepts a disjunct do not scale up in this way: take a group of opinionated
individuals, some of whom assent to φ∨ψ in virtue of accepting φ, the
rest of whom would do so in virtue of accepting ψ. What these indi-
viduals have in common is nothing beyond their acceptance of φ ∨ ψ.
From the fact that individuals in a given group accept a specific dis-
junct, it does not follow, of some specific disjunct, that the individuals
in the group accept that disjunct. Thinking otherwise is akin to think-
ing that, whenever each x has the property λx.∃yFxy, there is some y
with the property λy.∀xFxy. It is a very bad mistake indeed.
But the problem I have identified with disjunction does make such
a basic mistake. From the fact that individuals in a given group accept
a specific disjunct, it trivially follows that these individuals have in
common the property of accepting a disjunct. This is not akin to think-
ing that, whenever each x has the property λx.∃yFxy, there is some y
with the property λy.∀xFxy; the property we are attributing to each x
is simply the property in terms of which the x’s are collated to begin
with — a property of the form λx.∃yFxy. The state of mind apparently
individuated by the set of opinionated objects that accept φ or accept ψ
is, therefore, the state of mind of accepting at least one of the following
disjuncts: φ, ψ. That, again, is the wrong state of mind.
It might be thought that the analogy to possible worlds content
still offers hope. By the reasoning above, apparently, a set of possible
worlds all of whose members satisfy φ ∨ ψ, if it is regarded as a repre-
sentation of the state of mind of believing the proposition that φ ∨ ψ,
represents the state of mind of accepting at least one of the following
disjuncts: φ, ψ. Of course, this is not the state of mind it represents. So
the reasoning has gone off the rails somewhere.
Yes, but for an instructive reason. Sets of worlds represent attitudes
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indirectly. What they directly represent is a representational content, i.e.,
a proposition. Propositions are coarsenings of maximal bodies of infor-
mation (individual possible worlds). They are portions of a complete
story of what the world is like, pictures of a part of the world. The
picture extracted by taking the set of worlds at which φ ∨ ψ holds is
one in which φ or ψ is true; it is a picture on which we have an in-
dependent grip — independent, that is to say, of any reference to an
attitude of thinking that φ ∨ ψ. This picture can be used to indirectly
represent a state of mind: the state of mind of an agent who accepts
this set of worlds as locating the actual world. This is the state of mind
of believing, roughly, that either φ is true at the actual world, or ψ is.
This familiar story explains why, in the case of the possible worlds
content, it is a mistake to infer, from the fact that a set of worlds that
agree on an “opinion” with content p or content q represents a state of
mind M, that M has content p or content q. It is a story that, in general,
works roughly as follows:
Indirect Psychological Representation (IPR)
1. Describe a non-psychological relation R between an entity e
and a sentence φ that obtains in virtue of e’s bearing R to φ
2. Characterize the state of mind of accepting φ in terms of a
relation between an agent and the set of entities that bear R
to φ
IPR is a strategy for extracting a content from a set of entities and,
thereby, individuating an attitude indirectly: the attitude of accepting
that content. That R be non-psychological seems key to the IPR strategy
for disjunction: it allows the theorist to make sense of the idea that the
set of objects that bear R to φ∨ψ does not directly function to represent
a state of mind (and hence of the idea that the property of bearing
the relevant relation to φ or to ψ does not scale up). What it directly
represents is something abstract — a point of view on a (possibly non-
factual) subject-matter — toward which an agent can take an attitude
(e.g., acceptance). In this way, the state of mind involved in accepting
the sentence can be characterized, via an individuating content.18
Can Expressivists use IPR to explain why the attitude individuated
by Jφ ∨ ψK is not the disjunctive “attitude” of accepting φ or accepting
ψ? Consider the normative case. Whatever relation a Hyperplan bears
to a disjunction φ ∨ ψ is, we supposed, a (representation of a) psycho-
logical relation. What, then, are we characterizing with a set of entities
that bear this psychological relation to φ ∨ ψ? Apparently we are char-
acterizing this very psychological relation. What is this relation? It is the
relation of bearing the relevant psychological relation to φ or bearing
it to ψ. The state of mind thus characterized is, apparently, the wrong
state of mind. Note the asymmetry with possible worlds content: the
relation between a possible world and a sentence describing that pos-
sible world is a non-psychological true at relation. Hence collecting all
the possible worlds which are related to the sentence in this way yields
content intelligible independently of any psychological notions.
Thus far a problem of Type 1. To avoid it, Expressivists may either:
(i) abandon the disquotational treatment of disjunction, (ii) understand
the objects of semantic evaluation so that IPR can be utilized. As indi-
cated by his attempt to analogize planning content to possible worlds
content (and his commitment to a disquotational semantics for disjunc-
tion), Gibbard will opt for IPR: for extracting a non-representational
content with the right features from the relevant set of objects.
Here is how that will work in the normative case.19 Begin with the
18IPR is also at the heart of how mushy credences are modeled in Imprecise
Bayesianism, in which a state like thinking that it is between .7 and .8 likely
to rain today is understood in terms of a set of point-valued probability
functions (the set of Pr such that .7 < Pr(rain) < .8) (Levi, 1985; Joyce,
2005). From a set of probability functions — what Joyce (2005) terms a “set
of hypotheses about objective chances” — we extract a hypothesis about
objective chances equivalent to the (infinitary) disjunction of the hypotheses
represented within the set. The attitude individuated by such a set is the
attitude of accepting this disjunctive chance hypothesis.
19It is slightly misleading to present this as a response to the worry being de-
veloped here. This really just is Gibbard’s treatment of disjunction. I mention
it in this context because (i) it is an easy — effectively off-the-shelf — way
of avoiding the Type 1 problem developed in this section, (ii) its explanatory
blind-spots are, in the context of the earlier discussion of IPR, fairly clear.
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disquotational treatment of disjunction. Add to this a more explicit
formulation of the Hintikkan assumptions of §3.1: (i) an agent A is
associated with information I and plans P (with I the possible worlds
compatible with A’s information, P the Hyperplans compatible with
A’s plans), (ii) A = I × P gives A’s “total” mental state, (iii) A accepts
X just if A ⊆ JXK, with JXK the Gibbard Content for X. The following,
then, are obvious. First, A accepts φ ∨ ψ iff A ⊆ JφK ∪ JψK. Second, A
accepts φ or accepts ψ iff A ⊆ JφK or A ⊆ JψK. Thus, the fact that A
accepts φ ∨ ψ does not imply that A accepts φ or accepts ψ. Here we
have an effectively off-the-shelf resolution of the Type 1 problem.
Note, however, that there is no real attempt to fill in an IPR story
here. No justification is supplied for thinking that a suitable non-
representational content — one that properly characterizes acceptance
of φ ∨ ψ — can be extracted from the entities in JφK ∪ JψK. While we
have a good handle on the psychological property unifying the Hyper-
plans compatible with Jφ ∨ ψK — it is just the disjunctive property of
accepting φ or accepting ψ — the properties of the referenced content
are totally obscure. What we have is a Gibbard Content JφK∪ JψK paired
with a stipulation that the attitude of accepting φ ∨ ψ be understood in
terms of JφK∪ JψK. This is an IPR story, but an incomplete one.
One would hope for more. Why, say, is disjunctive syllogism valid?
Trivially, given the disquotational treatment of ¬ and ∨, Jφ ∨ ψK ∩J¬φK ⊆ JψK. But it is the content extracted from Jφ ∨ ψK that is sup-
posed to explain this validity (since it is this content that individuates
the state of mind of accepting φ∨ψ, rather than the psychological prop-
erty unifying the Hyperplans compatible with Jφ ∨ ψK). In the absence
of any independent description of the relevant content, we lack any
explanation of the inference’s validity. A problem of Type 1 becomes
one of Type 2.
Second (but ultimately more ambiguously), the solution here does
not even seem to work for its stated target. In an interesting discussion,
Schroeder (2011a) proves that, given plausible assumptions, the view
on offer cannot generate the right sort of content for mixed disjunctions:
sentences of the form φ ∨ ψE, where φ expresses an ordinary possi-
ble worlds proposition, but ψE receives an Expressivist interpretation.
(More carefully, he proves that the attitude picked out by the content
of a mixed disjunction for the sort of Expressivist we are discussing is
the attitude of accepting at least one disjunct.)
Consider again the normative case. Let A = I × P represent A’s
state of mind. Then, to represent the sort of indecision or uncertainty
that is typically associated with accepting φ ∨ ψE (without accepting
either φ or ψE), A must meet these conditions: (i) A ∩ JφK′ 6= ∅; (ii)
A∩ JψEK′ 6= ∅; (iii) A ⊆ JφK∪ JψEK. This, however, is impossible.20 The
most straightforward (i.e. Hintikkan) relationship between the seman-
tic value of φ ∨ ψE and the corresponding attitude ends up picking out
the wrong attitude.
This may seem like an instance of a more general problem which
this section’s discussion of disjunction has tried to describe. As
Schroeder (2011a) describes it, “[T]he method of world-[Hyperplan]
pairs provides us with a formal system which outstrips any inter-
pretation that we have given it... [It] tells us nothing at all about
what attitude is expressed by complex sentences with both normative
and non-normative parts.” Nevertheless, there are differences between
Schroeder’s disjunction problem and mine. His is specifically a Type
1 problem for mixed disjunctions, while mine is a Type 2 problem
(though Schroeder would presumably agree that his problem sets up
a Type 2 problem somewhere downstream). More importantly, notice
that Schroeder’s problem relies on the assumption that propositional
and non-propositional content are “independent” (in particular the as-
sumption that the incompatibility of some 〈w,pi〉 with ψE means the
20Notice the three conditions above respectively entail the following three
formal conditions on A = I × P:
∃w ∈ I : 〈w,pi〉 /∈ JφK (Hence, ∃w ∈ I : ∀pi ∈ P : 〈w,pi〉 /∈ JφK)
∃pi ∈ P : 〈w,pi〉 /∈ JψEK (Hence, ∃pi ∈ P : ∀w ∈ I : 〈w,pi〉 /∈ JψEK)
∀w ∈ I : ∀pi ∈ P : 〈w,pi〉 ∈ JφK or 〈w,pi〉 ∈ JψEK
The first two conditions entail that ∃w ∈ I : ∃pi ∈ P : 〈w,pi〉 /∈ JφK
and 〈w,pi〉 /∈ JψK, contradicting the third.
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incompatibility for any v of 〈v,pi〉 with ψE). There are various plausi-
ble ways of relaxing this assumption consistent with maintaining the
Hintikkan understanding of the relationship between semantic values
and attitudes articulated above (see, e.g., Silk, 2015).
But it is hard to see how any of this helps with the version of the dis-
junction problem sketched in this section. This problem is not resolved
by demonstrating (as Silk does) that a straightforward Hintikkan un-
derstanding of the relationship between semantic values and attitudes
needn’t have a Type 1 problem for mixed disjunctions. (Recall that this
problem was raised for a view which was assumed to resolve the Type
1 problem.) Resolving Schroeder’s problem still does not give us any
sort of handle on the content expressed by a disjunction. The attitude-
individuating contents of disjunctions — in particular, how they are de-
rived from sets of opinionated quasi-psychological entities — remain
obscure.
3.4 Disquotation
Because Expressivists commit themselves to explaining meaning in
terms of attitudes, they have an obvious difficulty in making use of
the sorts of disquotational techniques standardly used in natural lan-
guage semantics. As Schroeder (2011a) notes, “[T]he conditions under
which you believe that ¬P are not the complement of the conditions
under which you believe that P... and the conditions under which you
believe that P ∨ Q are not the union of the conditions under which
you believe that P and those under which you believe that Q.” Want-
ing to retain disquotational techniques, Content Expressivists like Gib-
bard claim that, while attitudes are fundamental, they do not appear
in the semantics. Instead, sets of objects — serving both to individuate
the intended attitudes and as arguments to the Boolean operations ex-
pressed by connectives — serve as the semantic values for E-sentences.
This, we saw, generates Type 1 difficulties. To resolve these, the Expres-
sivist exploits an analogy between ordinary possible worlds content
and the sort of non-representational content assigned by her seman-
tics. In each case, it is unclear why the non-representational contents
of negations and disjunctions (hence, the states of mind these contents
function to individuate) would have the explanatory powers the Ex-
pressivist needs them to have.
It is worth emphasizing why such problems do not arise in the pos-
sible worlds semantics after which Content Expressivism was modeled.
We have a good understanding of why (i) truth for a complex sentence
relative to a possible world is disquotational in the sense of Definition
1, (ii) collating possible worlds via a specific disquotational condition
in the metalanguage yields a content whose characteristics are fairly
transparent and well-understood. Regarding (i), we know that a world
w that made true ¬φ but failed to fail to make true φ (hence, made
true φ) is impossible (because contradictory). Similarly, we know that
a world w that made true φ∨ ψ but failed to make it true that φ or that
ψ is impossible (because contradictory). Regarding (ii), collating the
worlds that make true ¬φ (or alternatively φ ∨ ψ) thus yields a clearly
well-founded metalinguistic condition on a possible world: the condi-
tion of failing to make φ true (alternatively, making φ true or ψ true).
A condition thus-described — a proposition — is subsequently fit for
playing any number of well-founded theoretical roles (e.g., character-
izing attitudes via IPR).
This is an appealing way of rationalizing the sorts of smooth tran-
sitions from negations, disjunctions, etc., within the object langauge
to negations, disjunctions, etc., within the metalanguage spoken by se-
mantic theorists that are so central to semantic theorizing and expla-
nation. (I say more on the importance of these transitions below.) But
its availability to the Expressivist is doubtful. The Expressivism we’ve
been considering tries to mimic such transitions by (i) evaluating E-
sentences relative to hyper-opinionated, quasi-psychological entities,
(ii) making the fundamental semantic relation between E-sentences
and those entities disquotational, (iii) extracting attitudes from sets
of such entities via IPR. This project seems fated to raise explanatory
questions that Expressivists will despair of answering.
Why care about disquotation (and the attendant analysis of connec-
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tives as Boolean operations)? A first answer: this is simply how natural
language semantics (at least of the sort sketched in the prior two para-
graphs) is done. Compare Lewis’ well-known remark that non-truth-
conditional semantics (specifically, in this context, for indicative con-
ditionals embedded under connectives) “requires too much of a fresh
start” (1976: 305). Similarly, Schroeder (2011a) laments the fact that “an
expressivist semantics can’t work by simply applying the same sorts
of techniques to its ultimate semantic values as a truth-conditional se-
mantics can”. Far from Expressivists being able to “think about the
meaning of environments that embed E-sentences in a largely standard
way”, it looks like Expressivists will need to reinvent some perfectly
well-functioning wheels in semantic theorizing.
The critique requires elaboration. For it is wrong to view the loss of
Boolean semantics, per se, as a cost. Many well-developed semantic theo-
ries (e.g., those of Dynamic Semantics21) do not think of connectives as
expressing operations on elements of a Boolean algebra at all. Instead,
atomic sentences are treated as expressing update operations defined on
contexts or representations of information states, while the connectives
are treated as expressing various types of operations on such updates
(e.g., ∧ is the operation of executing two updates in sequence).
Further, there is reason to think ∧ (if ∧ is to represent natural lan-
guage conjunction) does not behave like ∩; natural language conjunc-
tion is, for instance, plausibly non-commutative.22
(16) Bob put the stunt double in a heat suit and lit him on fire
6∼Bob lit the stunt double on fire and put him in a heat suit
(17) Drink another beer and you’ll feel sorry
6∼You’ll feel sorry and drink another beer
21Some standard references: Kamp (1981); Heim (1982); Groenendijk and
Stokhof (1989, 1991); Veltman (1996).
22For arguments that this data is semantic in origin, see Bjorkman (2013);
Klinedinst and Rothschild (2012).
Similarly, there is reason to think that ∨ (if ∨ is to represent natural
language disjunction) does not behave like its Boolean counterpart ∪.23
(18) It might rain 6⇒ It might rain or it might snow
(19) It might rain or it might snow⇒ It might rain
(20) You may have an apple 6⇒ You may have an apple or have a pear
(21) You may have an apple or have a pear⇒ You may have a pear
If Expressivists can make profitable explanatory use of the sorts of
tools that semanticists have independently devised for representing
non-Boolean interpretations of the connectives, the charge of theoreti-
cal immodesty loses much of its bite.
Still, there is a cost to this departure from the tried-and-true. Se-
mantic theorizing is a technique for generating sentences in a theoreti-
cal metalanguage, on the way to generating semantic explanations and
theoretical entities (like contents) that can subsequently play various
theoretical roles. The purpose of this metalinguistic ascent is (i) to gen-
erate sentences the theorist is competent to understand (and evaluate)
in virtue of her competence with respect to that metalanguage, (ii) to
deploy this understanding to demonstrate various facts and construct
23While there is controversy about whether these facts are semantic or prag-
matic in origin (and about the bearing of this on the analysis of disjunction),
a prevalent view is that: (i) at least some of these implications (or failures
thereof) are entailments (or failures thereof) (see Kamp, 1974; Zimmermann,
2000; Geurts, 2005; von Fintel and Gillies, 2008), (ii) they are to be (partially)
explained by appeal to a non-classical semantics for disjunction (e.g. a se-
mantics on which the semantic function of a disjunction is to present its dis-
juncts as alternatives; see Alonso-Ovalle 2006; Aloni 2007; Groenendijk and
Roelofsen 2009). Whether they are entailments is actually immaterial given
my aims (although I generally will assume that they are). As Alonso-Ovalle
(2006) argues, the standard Boolean semantics for disjunction cannot gen-
erate the relevant implications (or failures of implication) pragmatically; a
pragmatic story should be supplemented with a non-classical alternative se-
mantics for disjunction. Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) tell a similar story for
indefinites, on which they have a non-classical alternative semantics (so are
not equivalent to classical existential quantifiers), but on which free-choice
effects arising from indefinites are given a pragmatic account.
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various entities within the metalanguage, towards various theoretical
ends.24 Disquotation is a key tool in this sort of practice.
To take a simple example, note that object-language inconsistency, of
the sort that holds between a sentence and its negation, is canonically
explained by showing that two inconsistent sentences allow the
theorist to derive a contradiction within the theoretical metalanguage.
Consider a disquotational semantic theory T for a language L with
fundamental semantic relation RT between sentences of L and
model-theoretic objects. T’s explanation of the inconsistency of a
sentence φ of L and its negation ¬φ is canonical just if a contradiction
is derivable from the assumption that both φ and ¬φ bear RT to
arbitrary model-theoretic object x. Canonicity, in this sense, is typically
achieved by exploiting disquotation:
Canonical Inconsistency
1. Suppose that RT(φ, x) and RT(¬φ, x)
2. Then, since T is disquotational, ¬RT(φ, x). Contradiction.
A simple example is the disquotational clauses for valuations in the
classical semantics for propositional logic. Making disquotation un-
available means making it difficult to replicate the canonical accounts
of the logical properties of any of the basic propositional connectives.
This is an unenviable position to be in.
Is this worry too strong? A non-Boolean semantics for the connec-
tives is, of necessity, non-disquotational (since a disquotational seman-
tics, in the sense of Definition 1, implies a Boolean semantics). If we
24The idea that one can give an explanatory Expressivist semantics simply by
formulating a “logic of attitudes” and a map between the object language
and the logic of attitudes (as in Blackburn, 1988; Horgan and Timmons, 2006)
seems to me misguided. A logic of attitudes is itself a language in need of a
semantics — it is, like Markerese, an uninterpreted formal language (cf. Lewis,
1970). To interpret it, one must associate terms in the logic with semantic
values, which will themselves be attitudes in the metalanguage of either folk
or empirical psychology. The detour through a logic of attitudes ultimately
serves no clear theoretical function.
take what I am saying seriously, the post-Boolean age in which seman-
ticists largely find themselves should be seriously reevaluated. While I
agree that this would be a bad thing to say, it is not what I am saying.
Consider, by way of illustration, a Veltman-type Dynamic Seman-
tics for a basic propositional language:
Definition 2. Let σ be a set of worlds and σ[φ] the result of updating σ with
a sentence φ. Then σ supports a sentence φ (σ  φ) iff σ[φ] = σ and σ 6= ∅.
Definition 3. ψ is a dynamic consequence of φ1, ..., φn (φ1, ..., φn  ψ) iff
∀σ : σ  φ1, ..., σ  φn implies σ  ψ
Definition 4. The dynamic interpretation function [·] is such that:
1. σ[p] = {w ∈ σ : w(p) = 1}
2. σ[¬φ] = σ− σ[φ]
3. σ[φ ∧ ψ] = σ[φ][ψ]
According to these definitions, the semantic value of any sentence is an
update program or instruction for a state or context; a state supports
a sentence just if the update expressed by the sentence is redundant at
that state; and logical consequence is a matter of preserving support.25
Such a semantics is non-Boolean and non-disquotational (cf. Yalcin,
2007, 1005–6). Note first that σ 6 φ does not imply σ  ¬φ; consider,
e.g., some σ such that σ * JφK and σ * JφK′.26 Thus, if |φ| gives the set
of σ’s such that σ  φ, |¬φ| 6= |φ|′.
25Other entailment relations are natural and definable (Veltman 1996: 224). I do
not see the choice mattering for purposes of this paper.
26I am treating  as the “fundamental semantic relation” (in the sense of Def.
1). In one sense,  is non-fundamental in Dynamic Semantics: it is defined in
terms of [·]. But it is fundamental in the sense I care about: it is a satisfaction
relation, and hence is the relation preserved under logical consequence. Com-
pare the satisfaction relation of first-order logic, which is non-fundamental in
the sense of being defined in terms of (i) the denotations of individual terms,
(ii) the denotations of n-ary predicates, (iii) a membership relationship (∈)
between n-length sequences of denotations for individual terms and denota-
tions of n-ary predicates. Nevertheless, the satisfaction relation of first-order
logic is paradigmatically fundamental in the sense relevant here.
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A widely-noted fact about such a Dynamic Semantics is that it is
isomorphic to a classical possible worlds semantics: for any φ, if JφK is
the set of worlds at which φ is true, σ[φ] = σ ∩ JφK. Canonical proofs
of object-language inconsistency thus remain available. To see this,
suppose we extend Definition 4 with a clause for a 0-place connective
⊥, such that ∀σ : σ[⊥] = ∅. It is easy to see that dynamic inconsistency
(φ,ψ  ⊥) reduces to dynamic entailment (φ  ¬ψ), which reduces to
classical entailment (φ |= ¬ψ).
Proof. φ,ψ  ⊥ iff, by Def. 3, for any σ, σ  φ and σ  ψ implies
σ  ⊥, iff, by Def. 2, σ[φ][ψ][⊥] = σ[φ][ψ] iff σ[φ][ψ] = ∅ iff
σ[φ]− σ[φ][ψ] = σ[φ] iff σ[φ][¬ψ] = σ[φ] iff φ  ¬ψ iff φ |= ¬ψ. 
The move to Dynamic Semantics, per se, implies no loss of explanatory
power — even by lights of the (very demanding) theoretical standards
on which we are insisting here. Whether  is itself a disquotational
relation is, in this case, immaterial.27
Expressivism’s position is different. Semantic explanations for Ex-
pressivists are supposed to trade on the properties of the attitudes ex-
pressed by E-sentences. The semantics for E-sentences, however, makes
use of sets of entities that (i) are assumed to behave disquotationally,
27More generally, while many of the sorts of theories one finds in contempo-
rary semantics are non-Boolean (thus non-disquotational), they tend to be
layered on top of a standard, Boolean semantics for a “base” language. Stan-
dard explanations of semantic phenomena within the base language can be
retained. It is important to note that, like Expressivist theories, Dynamic theo-
ries generally have proprietary explanations for phenomena that are difficult
to account for with the standard semantics for the “base” language. By design
such theories lack access to truth-conditional accounts of the semantic prop-
erties of such sentences; indeed, truth-conditional accounts of such sentences
tend to be viewed as theoretically or empirically deficient. Certain authors
(e.g., Schroeder 2011a) have regarded this as yielding a challenge for dynamic
accounts of, e.g., epistemic possibility modals (albeit for reasons not directly
having to do with the unavailability of standard explanatory strategies, i.e.,
a Type 2 challenge, instead for the reason that it yields a Type 1 challenge for
the dynamic view). I come back to this below.
(ii) thereby allow the ordinary “exportation” of object-language connec-
tives into the metalanguage (with the attendant theoretical benefits),
(iii) are supposed to individuate the attitude conventionally expressed
by the sentence. Items (i–ii) and (iii) are, I’ve claimed, in tension. A set
of entities meeting conditions (i–ii) will have difficulty meeting (iii): we
are hard-pressed to represent the relevant characteristics of an attitude
answering to (iii) with a set of entities meeting conditions (i–ii). We ob-
served this for negation: for JφK′ to represent acceptance of ¬φ, it was
necessary to assume away (without obvious justification) certain kinds
of Hyperplan. We also observed it for disjunction: for JφK ∪ JψK to rep-
resent acceptance of φ ∨ ψ, it was necessary to assume (again without
obvious justification) that entities compatible with JφK ∪ JψK had some
unifying characteristic over and above the obvious (namely: accepting
φ or accepting ψ).
Without well-founded appeals to disquotation, it is unclear how
to generate well-founded metalinguistic interpretations of complex object-
language sentences. How, then, is the Expressivist to generate well-
founded semantic explanations that can regarded as replacing the
truth-conditional explanations it rejects? It is unclear. Disquotation is
a key tool in accounting for core object-language semantic phenom-
ena, like inconsistency, in the metalanguage — even within ostensibly
non-classical approaches like Dynamic Semantics. Semantics sans dis-
quotation risks explanatory oblivion.
To close, a note on the relationship of this problem to the Frege-
Geach Problem. It is true that discussions of the Frege-Geach Prob-
lem in the literature are focused, as I am, on the problem for Ex-
pressivists of giving theoretically adequate compositional semantics
for E-sentences. However, charges of theoretical inadequacy are typ-
ically predicated on worries about whether the sort of inconsistency
Expressivists must assume between the attitudes expressed, e.g., by a
normative sentence and its negation is a genuine kind of logical incon-
sistency (similar to the inconsistency involved in representing both p
and ¬p as true) (see esp. Schroeder, 2008a,c,d). While this is part of
the worry voiced here, it is not the whole worry. I am not so much
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concerned with the ability of Expressivists to explain inconsistency as
I am concerned with their ability to engage in anything resembling
standard practice in semantic theorizing. The Frege-Geach Problem is
a symptom of a more general and troubling feature of Expressivism:
it has difficulty generating well-founded metalinguistic interpretations
of complex object-language sentences.
4. Semantics for Expressivists
In this paper’s remainder, I sketch an Expressivism with some promise
for resolving this problem. My main suggestion is that Expressivists
err in individuating the attitudes expressed by E-sentences by appeal
to content (contents, for our purposes, being sets of objects that be-
have disquotationally and individuate an attitude in a more-or-less
Hintikkan fashion). A better idea is to take a cue from Dynamic Se-
mantics: evaluate sentences relative to representations of attitudes that
are not assumed to behave disquotationally — representations, in other
words, of basically ordinary (e.g., non-hyperopinionated) states of mind.
Collecting the ordinary states that accept (more carefully: “support”)
a sentence yields a set of objects that corresponds to a property of a
mental state, what Swanson (forthcoming) refers to as a “constraint”.
If we do things right, the property will correspond to the state of mind
a speaker conventionally expresses by uttering that sentence. This sort
of strategy offers prima facie solutions to some of Expressivism’s more
serious problems with semantic explanation. Most strikingly, it allows
us to generate well-founded metalinguistic interpretations of complex
object-language sentences without presupposing disquotation.
Disjunction, however, remains vulnerable to a problem of Type 1. I
will state a semantics for disjunction that avoids this — one on which
the core semantic function of a disjunction is to present its disjuncts
as alternatives. I suggest a model on which treating something as an
alternative amounts to its availability as a candidate for the evolution
of one’s state of mind (hence, I will suggest, amounts to treating the
semantics of disjunction as essentially modal in nature; cf. Zimmer-
mann, 2000). The account yields a sensible, canonical (if not classical)
account of the semantic properties of disjunctions (not only the validity
of central inference patterns like disjunctive syllogism, but also some
interesting free-choice phenomena, like those mentioned in §3.4).
This section is titled “Semantics for Expressivists”. Here are some
caveats about what that will mean. First, there are several choicepoints
within the basic Dynamic framework I describe, in particular when it
comes to designing an Expressivist-friendly semantics for disjunction.
I don’t claim that my way is the only way — only that it is a way. Sec-
ond, the semantics I describe here has no intrinsic meta-ethical content.
Worryingly, it is a semantics of possibilia, rather than mental states. I
will save it for §5 to argue that the Expressivist can make use of it.
Last, the semantics is for a small fragment of a regimented version
of English: the fragment made up of atomic declaratives, various con-
nectives, and the sentential modals must, might, ought, and may. I will
refer the reader to other work for an idea of how to generalize the se-
mantic program of this section to a larger fragment of English. There
is a body of Dynamic work on conditionals (e.g. Gillies, 2009; Starr,
2014) and quantification (e.g. Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991). An Ex-
pressivist who favors the strategy of this paper can choose effectively
any semantics here (for my own attempt, see Charlow 2011: Ch. 4). The
Expressivist must at some point supply a credible story about the psy-
chological content of the semantics she elects to adopt (as in §5). How
this will work will depend on the semantics adopted.
4.1 Updates and Tests
Dynamic semantic values are typed as update programs: functions that
map an input state to a unique output state. In §3.4, we considered a
semantics on which sentences expressed only one kind of update pro-
gram — one equivalent to the addition of a sentence’s propositional
content to a standing body of information. In this sort of setup, a sen-
tence φ is supported by a state σ (σ  φ) just if φ’s propositional content
is already part of the information borne by σ (∅ ⊂ σ ⊆ JφK).
For sentences not thought to have propositional content — impera-
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tives, interrogatives, and, perhaps, epistemic modals, conditionals, nor-
mative claims — different operations on states (and enriched under-
standings of the nature of states) are required. Beyond this, for sen-
tences that seem to go in for assertion,28 a notion of assertion that goes
beyond Stalnaker’s (1978) model (on which update on an asserted sen-
tence simply amounts to addition of that sentence’s propositional con-
tent to a relevant body of information) will be required for a plausible
dynamic treatment of such sentences.
The main task for a Dynamic Semantics for Expressivists is to state
a model of non-propositional update in a broader dynamic system. To
this end, I will describe Veltman’s (1996) non-propositional test seman-
tics for modalities in natural language (and eventually marry it to a no-
tion of assertion on which sentences expressing tests may be asserted
and evaluated for truth, while failing to express propositions).29 Stan-
dard methods of generating metalinguistic interpretations of complex
object-language sentences remain, I will argue, available to us.
Test semantics for epistemic modals stems from a dual insight. First,
while executing some updates on a state means changing certain char-
acteristics of the state (e.g., enriching the state’s information), others
might involve testing the state for the presence of certain character-
istics. Second, epistemic modals are prima facie used in ways that
do not seem to recommend enriching one’s information, but rather
seem to recommend testing the state for the presence of certain non-
propositionally-individuable characteristics. Thus Veltman writes:
28Is there a general specification of which sentences go in for assertion? The
standard answer from linguists: any sentence in the declarative “mood” will
go in for assertion (see e.g. Portner, 2004). In light of, e.g., Dreier’s (1996)
‘Hiyo’ sentences, I prefer a richer notion of assertion: a sentence goes in for
assertion iff the sentence is evaluable for truth. More below.
29I will not be concerned with describing the empirical case for adopting this
semantics, so much as with briefly motivating and explaining the view. For
some of the motivation, see von Fintel and Gillies (2007).
[A]ll you can do when told that it might be the case that φ is to
agree or to disagree. If φ is acceptable in your information state S,
you must accept might φ. And if φ is not acceptable in S, neither
is might φ. Clearly, then, sentences of the form might φ provide an
invitation to perform a test on S rather than to incorporate some
new information in it. (1996: 229)
The idea is that might(φ) is evaluated for acceptability simply by check-
ing whether φ is compatible with the relevant information.30 If φ is
compatible, might(φ) is accepted — but since this sentence’s accep-
tance condition is φ’s compatibility with the information, the informa-
tion itself does not change. If φ is not compatible, might(φ) is rejected;
attempting to update on the sentence must yield something unaccept-
able. These informal reflections are reified in the following “test seman-
tics” for epistemic might.
“Testy” Dynamic might σ[might(φ)] =
{
σ, if σ[φ] 6= ∅
∅, otherwise
Notice that the inconsistency of a might and its negation is immediate.
Proof. Suppose σ  might(φ) and σ  ¬might(φ). Then σ[φ] 6= ∅
and σ = σ[¬might(φ)] = σ − σ[might(φ)]. Since σ = σ − σ[might(φ)],
σ[might(φ)] = ∅, hence σ[φ] = ∅. Contradiction. 
The support condition of might(φ) requires that φ is compatible with
the state (σ[φ] 6= ∅). The support condition of ¬might(φ) requires that
φ is incompatible with the state (σ[φ] = ∅). These two conditions are
logically incompatible; supposing both are met yields a contradiction.
In the simplest case, when φ is a sentence of the base propositional
language, the condition that σ[φ] 6= ∅ corresponds to the condition
that there is some possible world satisfying φ in σ, while the condition
30Note: this is to be distinguished from evaluating a proposition to the effect
that φ is compatible with some relevant body of information (cf. Yalcin, 2011).
philosophers’ imprint - 18 - vol. 15, no. 23 (august 2015)
nate charlow Prospects for an Expressivist Theory of Meaning
that σ[φ] = ∅ corresponds to the condition that there is no possible
world satisfying φ in σ; obviously no state meets these conditions.
Here is a template for generating canonical explanations of object-
language inconsistency that does not appeal to the characteristics of
propositions, or to disquotation. Epistemic modals, on the semantics
in question, lack propositional contents: from the content of an epis-
temic modal, it is not possible to isolate a set of worlds X such that
σ[might(φ)] = σ ∩ X. Coming to accept an epistemic modal is not a
matter of coming to accept some proposition: in general there is clearly
no X such that σ  might(φ) iff σ ⊆ X.31 As for disquotation, it suf-
fices to note that assumptions regarding the disquotational behavior of
σ play no role whatever in the explanation of the inconsistency of epis-
temic modals and their negations. Epistemic modals and their nega-
tions alike express “positive” conditions on σ. These conditions just
turn out to be contradictory. That  licenses the lifting of negation into
the metalanguage — i.e., σ  ¬might(φ) implies σ 6 might(φ) — is
derived as a prediction of the semantics, rather than stipulated.32
There is no question about whether advocates of this semantics are
“entitled” to such explanations. The explanations follow from an os-
tensibly empirically motivated (i) test semantics for epistemic modals,
(ii) definition of the operation expressed by negation. Barring some
challenge to the account’s empirical underpinnings, the explanations
should be regarded as genuine.
31Epistemic modals also lack persistence. A sentence φ is persistent iff, when
σ  φ and σ′ ⊆ σ, σ′  φ (Veltman 1996: 223). Obviously φ may be possible
relative to a relatively uninformed information state σ — hence σ  might(φ)
— but ruled out relative to a more informed information state σ′ ⊂ σ — hence
σ′ 6 might(φ). Rothschild and Yalcin (forthcoming) take issue with attempts
to link dynamic properties (like non-persistence) to non-propositionality. But
I am using ‘proposition’ in a different sense than they seem to be.
32Two caveats. First, note that σ 6 might(φ) implies, apparently incorrectly,
σ  ¬might(φ). There are ways around this that do not affect the account
of inconsistency offered here (see fn61). Second, this is not yet to argue that
Expressivists can make use of these explanations. I return to this in §5.
4.2 Deontic Modals
For Expressivists interested in a non-propositional semantics for de-
ontic may, a test semantics for may, modeled on the test semantics
for might, is a natural thing to pursue (see Charlow, 2013a; Starr, forth-
cominga). Indeed, similar empirical rationales could be constructed for
both. Veltman might have written:
All you can do when told that it may be the case that φ is to agree or
to disagree. If φ is permitted in view of your preferences, you must
accept may(φ). And if φ is not permitted, you must reject may(φ).
Clearly, then, sentences of the form may(φ) provide an invitation to
perform a test rather than to incorporate some new information.
The idea would be that may(φ) is evaluated for acceptability by check-
ing whether φ is permitted relative to the relevant preferences.33 If φ
is compatible, may(φ) is accepted — but since this sentence’s accep-
tance condition is φ’s compatibility with the relevant preferences, the
relevant preferences and information do not change. If φ is not so com-
patible, may(φ) is rejected; attempting to update on with may(φ) must
yield something unacceptable.
Pursuing this idea requires enriching the notion of a state:
Definition 5. σ ⊆W is an information space
33As before, this is to be distinguished from evaluating a proposition to the ef-
fect that φ is compatible with some relevant preferences. Note that preference
admits of two readings: an attitude (e.g., Bob’s preference for coffee over
tea) and an abstract criterion determining rankings on outcomes, actions,
and the like (e.g., morality’s preference for impartiality). I will initially use
‘preference’ in the latter sense; the former sense will come into play when
we imbue the formal apparatus with psychological content (§5.3). Preference
may, in the end, not be the right sort of attitude for deontic modals to express;
perhaps an attitude like planning would be better (as Gibbard 2003 argues).
There is also the tricky question of how to distinguish the sort of attitude ex-
pressed by, e.g., a moral reading of a deontic modal from the one expressed
by a legal reading of the same deontic modal. Are both attitudes preferences?
If so, how are they distinguished? These are hard questions that I will not set-
tle here. I aim only to outline a semantic architecture that addresses worries
about the very possibility of explanatory Expressivistic semantic theorizing
(§3). While I can see ways to adapt the basic architecture to address such
questions, I cannot pursue this here. (Thanks here to Matthew Chrisman.)
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Definition 6. pi(·) is a selection function mapping an information space σ
into a subset of σ; pi(σ) is a permissibility sphere
Definition 7. S = 〈σ,pi(σ)〉 is a state iff σ is an information space and pi
is a selection function.
A state S = 〈σ,pi(σ)〉 provides an “information-tracking” parameter
σ and a loosely “action-guiding” parameter pi, now styled as a selec-
tion function selecting the best (in view of relevant criteria) possibilities
from σ to yield something like a Lewisian sphere of permissibility (cf.
Lewis, 1979b).34 A state whose information is compatible with p, ¬p,
q, and ¬q, but with a p-entailing sphere of permissibility can be visu-
alized as follows. Note the shading (due to Starr, forthcomingb).
pq pq
pq pq
What state of mind does a pair 〈σ,pi(σ)〉 represent? It represents the
state of mind in which (i) an agent’s information is representable with
σ, (ii) her preferences (given σ) are representable with pi(σ). Part (i) is, I
take it, familiar. As for (ii): one’s preferences (given σ) are representable
with pi(σ) iff, roughly, one strictly prefers (conditional on the informa-
tion represented in σ) any world in pi(σ) to any world not in pi(σ).
More roughly: this represents a strict preference (conditional on σ) for
the proposition characterized by pi(σ) to the proposition characterized
34Every Hyperplan characterizes a selection function, but not every selection
function will correspond to a Hyperplan, given plausible assumptions about
the distinction between weakly permitting p and strongly permitting p (An-
derson, 1966). More on this in §5.3 (fn61). For now, this is the simplest treat-
ment of deontic modals compatible with the Kratzer (1977, 1981) paradigm.
To keep things simple, I suppress some issues: what the relevant information
is (the nature of the modal base), what the relevant preferences are (the na-
ture of the ordering source), how a selection function is derived from a body
of preferences, etc.
by pi(σ)′. I will have more to say on the semantics’ psychological con-
tent below, but this will give an initial sense.
States are now understood as having more structure than simple
information spaces: they supply an information space as well as a se-
lection function. This complicates the semantics. While support can
continue to be understood in terms of trivial update — S  φ iff
S[φ] = S 6= 〈∅,∅〉 — updates were originally defined on informa-
tion spaces; they must now be defined on more complicated objects.
The present suggestion is that may(φ) tests for φ’s compatibility with
the sphere of permissibility. Epistemic modals continue to express con-




〈σ,pi(σ)〉, if pi(σ)[φ] 6= ∅
〈∅,∅〉, otherwise
Dynamic might, take two
〈σ,pi(σ)〉[might(φ)] =
{
〈σ,pi(σ)〉, if σ[φ] 6= ∅
〈∅,∅〉, otherwise
I assume that (i) sentences of the base propositional language LP con-
tract σ and, correspondingly, pi(σ),36 (ii) updating information spaces
and permissibility spheres (and more generally sets of worlds) with
such sentences remains well-defined: for any X ⊆ W and φ ∈ LP,
X[φ] = X ∩ JφK. Thus:
Base Update
For atomic p ∈ LP: 〈σ,pi(σ)〉[p] = 〈σ[p],pi(σ)[p]〉
35Bookkeeping note: these sorts of updates are assumed to distribute to the
sub-parts of the state, so that 〈σ,pi(σ)〉[φ] := 〈σ[φ],pi(σ)[φ]〉.
36I thus assume that pi is monotonic: when σ′ ⊆ σ, pi(σ′) ⊆ pi(σ). I do this
only for simplicity: I would in fact reject the notion that pi is monotonic. For
critical discussion of monotonicity, see Charlow (2013a,b).
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Propositional Sub-Update
For φ ∈ LP and τ ⊆W: τ[φ] = {w ∈ τ : w(p) = 1}
We will consider the connectives individually. Per Definition 4, ¬φ
removes φ-possibilities (from the state’s information). This idea fails
for negated may.37 While we do know what conditions ¬might(φ) and
¬may(φ) should test for — respectively, φ’s incompatibility with the
relevant information and φ’s incompatibility with the permissibility
sphere — generating these tests compositionally is another matter. The
simplest solution is to continue to understand negation in terms of
set-subtraction, but to generalize the idea so that negation operates
separately on each parameter of a state.
Generalized Negation
S[¬φ] = S	 S[φ]
Note: 〈σ,pi(σ)〉 	 〈σ∗,pi∗(σ∗)〉 := 〈σ− σ∗,pi(σ)− pi∗(σ∗)〉
We can thus visualize update on a propositional negation ¬q (at a
state whose information is compatible with p, ¬p, q, and ¬q, but with
a p-entailing sphere of permissibility) as follows. (Note: crosshatched













As desired, ¬might(φ) and ¬may(φ) test for φ’s incompatibility with
the relevant domain.
Proof. S[¬might(φ)] = S iff S = S 	 S[might(φ)] iff S[might(φ)] =
〈∅,∅〉 iff σS[φ] = ∅
37There is no parallel issue for ∧: we can always understand ∧ as expressing
sequencing on update functions, i.e., function composition. Disjunction is
more complicated; we postpone it until §4.3.
Proof. S[¬may(φ)] = S iff S = S	 S[may(φ)] iff S[may(φ)] = 〈∅,∅〉 iff
piS(σS)[φ] = ∅
The inconsistency of a may and its negation is immediate:
Proof. Suppose S  may(φ) and S  ¬may(φ). Then piS(σS)[φ] 6= ∅
and S = S[¬may(φ)] = S	 S[may(φ)], hence S[may(φ)] = 〈∅,∅〉. But
piS(σS)[φ] 6= ∅, so S[may(φ)] 6= 〈∅,∅〉. Contradiction.
As with dynamic might, the acceptance condition of may(φ) is that
φ is compatible with the sphere of permissibility, while ¬may(φ) re-
quires that φ is incompatible with the sphere of permissibility (oth-
erwise, S[may(φ)] is nonempty, hence S 6= S− S[may(φ)]). These two
conditions — that piS(σS)[φ] 6= ∅ and piS(σS)[φ] = ∅ — are logically
incompatible; supposing both are met generates a contradiction.
In the simplest case, when φ ∈ LP, the condition that piS(σS)[φ] 6=
∅ corresponds to the condition that there is some possible world satis-
fying φ in piS(σS), while the condition that piS(σS)[φ] = ∅ corresponds
to the condition that there is no possible world satisfying φ in piS(σS);
obviously no state meets these conditions. More generally, in cases
where φ ∈ LP, may(φ) behaves as we would expect: as an existential
quantifier over the relevant domain:
S  may(φ) iff ∃w ∈ piS(σS) : w ∈ JφK
Although on a test semantics may(φ) does not express an existentially
quantified proposition (for the same reasons that, on a test semantics,
might(φ) does not function to express an existentially quantified propo-
sition), the explanation of the inconsistency of it with its negation looks
the same as if it did: may(φ) requires that there be a φ-world compati-
ble with the domain defined by the relevant preferences and informa-
tion, while ¬may(φ) requires that every φ-world compatible with the
domain is a ¬φ world.
Whether this explanation is available to the proponent of test se-
mantics for deontic modals is an empirical question. Opponents of test
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semantics for deontic modals are welcome to challenge the empirical
considerations that will be used to motivate it. Until they do, the ex-
planations look as if they are workable and canonical. (Again, I return
to the question of whether Expressivists about deontic modals can use
this sort of strategy to explain normative inconsistencies in §5.)
4.3 Disjunction
It would be very natural to state a generalized notion of disjunction,
modeled after generalized negation:
Generalized Disjunction
S[φ ∨ ψ] = S[φ] unionsq S[ψ]
Note: 〈σ,pi(σ)〉 unionsq 〈σ∗,pi∗(σ∗)〉 := 〈σ ∪ σ∗,pi(σ) ∪ pi∗(σ∗)〉
But this turns out to be problematic: given a test semantics for might
or may, we run into Schroeder’s Type 1 disjunction problem (§3.3);
I will review this below. A solution is to move away from thinking
of disjunction as a Boolean operation on sets of points, toward the
idea that disjunctions function primarily to present their disjuncts as
alternatives (with ordinary Boolean interpretations arising as a special
case). Before beginning, I will note that my goals here are modest: first,
to further complicate with some suggestive data the simple picture
of ∨ on which its meaning is a Boolean operation on sets of points;
second, to suggest a different semantics for ∨ of which the Expressivist
can eventually make use.
4.3.1 Problems with Generalized Disjunction
When ψ is a test, Generalized Disjunction predicts: S  φ ∨ ψ iff S  φ
or S  ψ.38
38Both referees note that this problem does not arise on a common Dynamic
understanding of disjunction, on which S[φ ∨ ψ] := S[¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)] =
S 	 S[¬φ][¬ψ]. But how would this understanding of disjunction be justi-
fied? (This is not a question that normally arises, but it makes sense to ask
here.) As a proposal about logical form, it is noncompositional: negations,
e.g., are posited ex nihilo. Of course, routing the semantics for disjunction
Proof. (⇒) Suppose S  φ ∨ ψ. Then S = S[φ ∨ ψ], so S = S[φ] unionsq S[ψ].
Since [ψ] is a test, there are two cases: S[ψ] = S or S[ψ] = 〈∅,∅〉. If
S[ψ] = S, then S  ψ. If S[ψ] = 〈∅,∅〉, then S[φ] unionsq S[ψ] = S[φ], in
which case S  φ. In each case, S  φ or S  ψ. (⇐) Immediate. 
I will eventually argue that this creates a problem for understanding
disjunction along the lines of Generalized Disjunction. But I disagree
with Schroeder about the nature of this problem, for two reasons.
Reason (i): It is desirable that S  φ ∨ ψ imply that S  φ or S  ψ.
Reason (ii): What is problematic is the other direction: that S  φ or
S  ψ implies S  φ ∨ ψ.39 I will take these claims in order.
Reason (i). While disjunctions over bare possibility modals do seem
to license inferring the possibility modal — cf. (19) and (21) (and later
through ∧ and ¬ is not essential: we might simply say that S[φ ∨ ψ] :=
S 	 ((S 	 S[φ]) 	 (S 	 S[φ])[ψ]). This is compositional, but (so far) unmo-
tivated — it is inter-definition of ∨ with ¬ and ∧ in all but name. What
is wanted is a principled answer to the question what operation does ∨ ex-
press? The natural such operation, I’d suggest, is ∪ over sets of objects (mod-
ulo some provision for presupposition projection in disjunctions, as in Roth-
schild, 2011). Much work in Dynamic Semantics — recognizing perhaps that
syncategorematic treatments of logical constants are hard to sustain in nat-
ural language semantics — does understand disjunction in terms of ∪ over
sets of objects (see, e.g., Veltman, 1996; Rothschild, 2011). Regardless of how
we answer the question what operation does ∨ express?, it would seem desir-
able for the Expressivist to have an account of disjunction on which its logical
connections to ¬ and ∧ are not a matter of stipulation. Defining ∨ in terms of
¬ and ∧, whether literally or in-all-but-name, seems wrongly to make these
connections a matter of stipulation.
39Though these claims supply motivation for my semantics for disjunction, its
success does not depend on them; I will be content to present some sugges-
tive data in their favor. The data — particularly for free-choice effects — is
quite intricate, especially the semantic effect of varying the relative scope of
the modal and ∨. von Fintel, e.g., thinks free-choice implications are entail-
ments when the disjunction takes wide scope (von Fintel and Gillies, 2008),
but implicatures when the modal takes wide scope (von Fintel, 2012). Aloni
(2007) appears to favor the opposite view, while Zimmermann (2000) favors
an account on which they are all entailments. So things are very complicated.
Here my goal is (i) to present a relatively restricted data set (focusing on
cases where ∨ takes widest scope) and, later, (ii) to suggest some strategies
for accounting for that data that the Expressivist can ultimately take on.
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discussion in §4.3.3) — the following are problematic on their face:
S  φ ∨ ¬might(ψ) only if S  φ or S  ¬might(ψ)
S  φ ∨ ¬may(ψ) only if S  φ or S  ¬may(ψ)
Negated possibility modals express a kind of necessity; they ex-
press “decided” states of mind. But disjunctions ordinarily function to
express indecision about their disjuncts. While indecision directed at
sentences expressing indecision may perhaps imply indecision about
those sentences — see (19) and (21) — indecision directed at sentences
expressing decision does not seem like it should imply decision about
any of those sentences. When ψ is a negated possibility modal, then, it
seems S  φ ∨ ψ should not imply S  φ or S  ψ.
Schroeder (2011a) illustrates the point with a case: “Jill finds out
that Jack took a vacation last year to one of the non-contiguous U.S.
states... [S]he concludes that [(22)].”
(22) Either Jack went to Alaska, or he must have gone to Hawaii
Letting a = Jack went to Alaska and h = Jack went to Hawaii, here
we have a case where Jill accepts a ∨ ¬might(¬h), but does not accept
a and does not accept ¬might(¬h).
I find this unpersuasive. Note that addition of a discourse particle
else that is anaphoric to the negation of some earlier-introduced condi-
tion apparently effects no change in meaning to (22):
(23) Either Jack went to Alaska, or else he must have gone to Hawaii
This indicates that the second disjunct is modally subordinated, meaning
that it is interpreted with its domain of quantification restricted to
worlds where Jack did not go to Alaska (see esp. Roberts, 1989). On
this interpretation, however, Jill does accept the second disjunct, since
its meaning is, on the standard Kratzer (1991) semantics for indicative
conditionals (on which indicative antecedents are domain-restrictors
for modals in the consequent), equivalent to:40
(24) If Jack did not go to Alaska, he must have gone to Hawaii
Notice further that reversing the order of the disjuncts renders the
original sentence unacceptable:
(25) ??Either Jack must have gone to Hawaii, or he went to Alaska
Understanding (23) under the rubric of modal subordination explains
this contrast, if we suppose, plausibly, that modals occurring in dis-
junctions prefer to be subordinated.41 Modal subordination is order-
sensitive: subordinated modals make use of domain restrictions that
have been introduced into the discourse. In (25) no restriction is yet
available, so the modal’s preference for being subordinated is violated.
More generally, when we have a disjunction whose right disjunct
has a domain-sensitive semantics, appealing to modal subordination
to explain away the apparently problematic nature of the relevant en-
tailment seems appealing. Consider two other of Schroeder’s cases. In
40Schroeder (2011a) dismisses the idea that the disjunction has a reading where
its second disjunct has a conditional meaning, on the grounds that “there is
something very suspicious about needing to postulate special ad hoc rules
for special readings that arise only in certain contexts” (24). But Klinedinst
and Rothschild (2012) argue on a variety of grounds that the core meaning
of disjunction forces this sort of domain restriction in right-disjunct modals.
41The preference is generally strong. Notice how difficult it is to assign a sen-
sible reading to a sentence like the following: John must be in London or he
must be in Paris, but I don’t know which. The only way to read the emendation
is as elliptical for I don’t know whether he is in London or Paris (though I find
this reading hard to access). Reading it as elliptical for I don’t know whether
he must be in London or must be in Paris is nonsensical. In other words, when
∨ takes widest scope over two epistemic necessity modals, the sentence is
uninterpretable. This is readily explained if modals occurring in disjunctions
strongly prefer to be modally subordinated.
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the first, Shieva asks her magic 8-ball if she should give up on her
paper. Since most of the 8-ball’s answers are positive, we infer:
(26) Either Shieva finished her paper by now or she probably gave up
In the second, we believe Karen got a Ph.D. from Columbia, NYU, or
CUNY, so we infer:
(27) Either Karen went to Columbia, or if she didn’t go to NYU, then
she went to CUNY
We seem to read the right disjunct as modally subordinated by the left
disjunct’s negation:
(28) If Shieva didn’t finish her paper by now, she probably gave up
(29) If Karen didn’t go to NYU and didn’t go to Columbia, then she
went to CUNY
Someone who accepts (26) and (27) simply accepts (28) and (29). Far
from problematic, the fact that a test semantics for, say, probably
or if would predict that acceptance of φ ∨ ψ (where ψ is a probably
or an if) implies acceptance of φ or of ψ should be regarded as a
desirable property of the semantics. Indeed, we would hope to predict
something even stronger: when ψ is a test, acceptance of φ ∨ ψ should
imply acceptance of ψ, on its modally subordinated reading.
Reason (ii). What is, I will now argue, problematic is that S  φ would
imply S  φ ∨ ψ. Why? Most clearly, as (32) and (33) illustrate, there
are counterexamples, plausibly explained by the fact that disjunctions
of the form might(φ)∨might(ψ) or may(φ)∨may(ψ) entail each of their
disjuncts, as in (19) and (21).42 Generalized Disjunction fails here.
42The acceptability of such disjunctions might appear puzzling against the un-
acceptability of corresponding disjunctions with strong necessity modals, as
in fn41). The difference: with disjunctions of possibility modals, “double en-
Further: if φ ∨ must(ψ) implies, as claimed, its (modally subordi-
nated) right disjunct, then acceptance of φ should not imply acceptance
of φ∨must(ψ) (since this implies acceptance of the right disjunct, on its
modally subordinated reading). (30) seems not to imply (31). But (31)
will be an entailment of (30), if disjunction introduction is validated.43
(30) Jack went to Alaska
(31) If Jack didn’t go to Alaska, he went to Antarctica
The core problem. To be explicit, let M(φ)(ψ) represent a modal with
a domain restriction φ and a scope ψ. (Unrestricted modals can be repre-
sented as special cases, with a vacuous restriction to >.) The restriction
device does what you’d expect: it restricts the domain on which the test




S, if piS(σS[φ])[ψ] 6= ∅
〈∅,∅〉, otherwise
I have argued that a semantics for disjunction should predict: (i) φ∨
M(¬φ)(ψ) does imply M(¬φ)(ψ); (ii) φ does not imply φ ∨M(¬φ)(ψ).44
tailment” readings in which the prejacent of the left modal restricts the do-
main of the right modal (see Klinedinst and Rothschild 2012: 173–4). make
good sense. With disjunctions of necessity modals, such readings generally
do not make sense. These facts fall out of the semantics I will state below.
43While the unacceptability of (31) at a state that accepts (30) might be traced
to the fact that indicative conditionals presuppose the compatibility of their
antecedents with the relevant domain (Stalnaker, 1975; von Fintel, 1998), it
remains embarrassing to treat this as an entailment for a number of reasons.
Here is one: if it is an entailment, it seems we should be able to infer, from
the fact that (30) is probably true, that (31) is probably true, without violating
any presuppositional requirements of the conditional’s antecedent.
44I assume, for disjunctions whose right disjunct is modal, the modal is obli-
gatorily subordinated by the negation of the left disjunct. This is a strong
assumption, but a motivated one (see Klinedinst and Rothschild, 2012). Here,
it will be codified syntactically: I discuss only disjunctions of the form
φ ∨M(¬φ)(ψ), implicitly treating cases like φ ∨M(>)(ψ) as ill-formed.
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But, on Generalized Disjunction, S  φ ∨ must(¬φ)(ψ) iff S  φ or
S  must(¬φ)(ψ). Generalized Disjunction thus fails with respect to
these desiderata. It does, to be clear, have the (desirable) property that
φ ∨must(¬φ)(ψ) entails must(¬φ)(ψ).
Proof. Suppose S  φ∨must(¬φ)(ψ). Then: S  φ or S  must(¬φ)(ψ).
The latter case is trivial. So suppose S  φ. Then S  must(¬φ)(ψ) iff
S[must(¬φ)(ψ)] = S iff σS[¬φ][ψ] = σS[¬φ]. But since S  φ, S[¬φ] =
〈∅,∅〉. So σS[¬φ] = σS[¬φ][ψ] = ∅. Hence S  must(¬φ)(ψ).
But, since φ implies φ ∨ ψ, Generalized Disjunction predicts that φ im-
plies must(¬φ)(ψ); for instance, (30) implies (31). This is something we
would hope to avoid. I will call it the core problem with disjunction for
the proponent of test semantics for epistemic and deontic modals.
4.3.2 Alternative Semantics
I will now sketch a semantics that makes good on the above dis-
cussion. The key idea: disjunction does not work as Generalized
Disjunction would have it, i.e., as Boolean union on sets of points.
Disjunction rather serves to present alternative possibilities, à la Kratzer
and Shimoyama (2002); Krifka (2004); Alonso-Ovalle (2006); Aloni
(2007); Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009) (among many others).
Overview. There is independent motivation for this sort of idea, and
the supplied references give a great deal of it. The key idea45 is that dis-
junctions have a dual function — they both provide information (regard-
ing the acceptability of the disjunction) and raise an issue (regarding
which disjunct is true). Disjunctions, in other words, have both an in-
formational and (something rather like an) inquisitive function. In fact,
the fundamental function of a disjunction is to raise an issue; disjunc-
tions inform by raising issues that jointly cover a proper sub-region of the
relevant region of logical space. (To contrast, questions do not inform
45This overview (and the semantics I go on to state) draws most on Groenendijk
and Roelofsen (2009).
because the issues they raise are generally thought to jointly cover the
whole of the relevant region of logical space.) These ideas are normally
implemented in a static framework building on the standard semantics
for interrogatives (on which interrogatives express questions, which are
in turn understood as partitions of logical space — divisions into mu-
tually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cells corresponding to the ques-
tion’s complete answers (Hamblin, 1958; Karttunen, 1977; Groenendijk
and Stokhof, 1984). A question can thus be thought of as a special kind
of issue: an uninformative issue.46
Definition 8. I = {A1, ..., An} is an issue iff Ai ⊆W, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n
1. I is informative relative to a set of points S iff S ∩⋃ I 6= S .
2. I is a question relative to S iff {A : ∃A′ ∈ I : A = A′ ∩ S}
partitions S .
Instead of thinking of the semantic value of a disjunction φ ∨ ψ as
a set of objects that witness the truth of φ or the truth of ψ, we are
invited to think of its semantic value as consisting, very roughly, of the
set of answers to the question is it the case that φ or ψ?, i.e., {JφK, JψK}.47
More generally:
Alternative Disjunction (Static)Jφ ∨ ψKalt = {JφKclassical} ∪ {JψKclassical}
Figs. (a) and (b) represent, respectively, propositions p and q. Classi-
cal disjunction identifies Jp ∨ qK with their union, Fig. (c). Alternative
disjunction identifies Jp ∨ qK with the issue in Fig. (d).
46There is also the requirement of mutual exclusivity, i.e., that questions express
sets of complete answers that are pairwise incompatible. I follow Isaacs and
Rawlins (2008) in endorsing the idea that questions express partitions (which
entails mutual exclusivity). Probably disjunctions too should be required to
express mutually exclusive cells, as I note later (cf. Alonso-Ovalle, 2006).
47This is not to say that disjunctions partake in the distinctive pragmatic charac-
teristics of questions. In particular, since disjunctions are generally informa-
tive, they are evaluable for truth; questions are not. (Even when uninforma-
tive, disjunctions are typically evaluable for truth via conveying something
informative non-semantically.)
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The informational content of p ∨ q is the same whether we choose (c)
or (d) for Jp ∨ qK: the disjunction is inconsistent with worlds where
both p and q are false, hence is potentially informative, while the
question ?p (which partitions the relevant space) is not.
Dynamicized. It is natural — and for our purposes essential — to
dynamicize these ideas, by letting disjunctions introduce distinct states
as alternatives for the input state, so that the result of updating with
a disjunction is a set of alternative states (here cf. Krifka, 2004). For
uniformity, we will understand the objects of update — Inquisitive
States — as sets of states in the sense of Definition 7.
Definition 9. If S is a state, then Σ = {S, 〈∅,∅〉} is an inquisitive state.
If Σ and Σ′ are inquisitive states, then Σ ∪ Σ′ is also an inquisitive state.
Nothing else is an inquisitive state.
An inquisitive state (hereafter “state”) is an object like the following.48
48Given the relatively expansive understanding of inquisitive states we have
adopted, it might make sense to consider correspondingly revising our un-
derstanding of issues and questions as follows:
Definition 10. Σ is an issue iff, for each S ∈ Σ, S is a state














2. Σ is a question relative to Σ∗ iff, for all S ∈ Σ, S∗ ∈ Σ∗ : S u S∗ = S∗ or S u
S∗ = 〈∅,∅〉 or S u S∗ = 〈σ∗,∅〉 [Note: S u S∗ := 〈σ ∩ σ∗,pi(σ) ∩ pi∗(σ∗)〉]
This would allow us to think of notions like informativeness and question-
hood free of the presuppositions that (i) only propositions are informative,
(ii) only partitions of logical space are questions. There may be, e.g., ques-








Note: when nothing turns on it, I tend to ignore the membership of the
absurd alternative 〈∅,∅〉 in inquisitive states.
Non-issue sentences distribute updates “across” a state. If Sal says
Jack went to Alaska or Hawaii, then adds that he flew, this percolates to
each alternative: the possibility that Jack went to Alaska is evaluated
supposing that he flew there. It is thus trivial to extend our earlier
update definitions to cover inquisitive states. If φ does not introduce
an issue, update on φ percolates throughout the state.49
Percolation
For non-disjunctive φ: Σ[φ] =
⋃
S∈Σ{S[φ]}
S[φ] is as defined previously. The core idea for disjunction is this: up-
dating Σ on φ ∨ ψ introduces φ and ψ as alternatives.
Alternative Disjunction (Dynamic)
Σ[φ ∨ ψ] = Σ[φ] ∪ Σ[ψ]50
that concern what to prefer or plan, rather than how to represent the world.
I will not pursue this here, but see Charlow (2011, Ch. 4) for some discussion.
49Percolation resembles Willer’s “Updates on Information States” (2013: 57).
The resulting treatment of possibility modals thus appears similar to Willer’s.
I will ultimately, however, suggest thinking of modals as tests on inquisitive
states, rather than tests on non-inquisitive components of inquisitive states.
More generally, while Willer will think of the pragmatics of modalities in
terms of the alternatives they eliminate, I do not, as I explain below.
50Note that when φ |= ¬ψ and Σ  φ, Σ = Σ[φ] ∪ Σ[ψ], so Σ  φ ∨ ψ. This,
I have suggested, is to be avoided. Inspired by Zimmermann (2000), I will
officially suppose that the semantics of disjunction requires treating each dis-
junct as (roughly speaking) possible, hence that the alternatives introduced
by the disjunction support the corresponding disjunct. Thus:
Alternative Disjunction (Official)
Σ[φ ∨ ψ] =
{
Σ[φ] ∪ Σ[ψ], if Σ[φ]  φ and Σ[ψ]  ψ
{〈∅,∅〉}, otherwise
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For propositional disjunctions, dynamic and static alternative dis-
junction are equivalent: Σ[φ ∨ ψ] is just the result of collecting each
S[A], for each S ∈ Σ and alternative A ∈ Jφ ∨ ψK. For example, updat-












Support and consequence are unchanged: Σ  φ iff Σ[φ] = Σ and
Σ 6= {〈∅,∅〉}; φ1, ..., φn  ψ iff ∀Σ : Σ  φ1, ...,Σ  φn implies Σ  ψ.
Testy Disjunctions. A test-embedding disjunction like φ ∨M(¬φ)(ψ)
seems to lack a well-defined static alternative semantic value.51 So,
when ψ expresses a test, it is not generally possible to obtain Σ[φ ∨ ψ]
in the way just suggested: collecting each S-updated-with-A (for each
S ∈ Σ and A ∈ Jφ ∨ ψK) is not viable when Jφ ∨ ψK is undefined.
Dynamic alternative disjunction shows one way forward. Using it,
Σ[φ∨M(¬φ)(ψ)] = Σ[φ]∪Σ[M(¬φ)(ψ)]. By Percolation, this = Σ[φ] ∪
When talking of Σ[φ∨ ψ], I generally assume that Σ[φ]  φ and Σ[ψ]  ψ. In-
formally, I assume that updating on a disjunction will generally force treating
each disjunct as a robust alternative. In assuming this, we assume away cer-
tain failures of what Rothschild and Yalcin (forthcoming) dub Idempotence.
In any system containing tests in which ∧ means sequencing, Idempotence
occasionally fails. (For instance, let ψ = might(p)(q) ∧ ¬q.) Such failures are
(in my view) empirically and theoretically peripheral; it does little harm to
bracket them. Alternative Disjunction, by the way, supplies its own Idem-
potence failures when the disjuncts are propositional: notice {S}[p ∨ q] =
{S}[p] ∪ {S}[q], but {S}[p ∨ q][p ∨ q] = {S}[p] ∪ {S}[q] ∪ {S}[q][p]. I avoid
these by appeal to the obligatory exclusivity of propositional disjunction: for
non-defective p ∨ q, S[q][p] = 〈∅,∅〉 (cf. Alonso-Ovalle, 2006).
51There is a sense in which an epistemic modal might express what Roth-
schild and Yalcin (forthcoming) term an “information-sensitive” proposition
on which the information can update: if its support condition is met by the
state, the state updates on >; if not, it updates on ⊥. While such “proposi-
tions” are a formal possibility, it is hard to see how to put them to theoretical
work. I will ignore them.
⋃
S∈Σ{S[M(¬φ)(ψ)]}. In the simplest case (where φ is non-disjunctive
and propositional, and Σ = {S}, and letting DM give the relevant
domain for modal M and C the condition for which M tests DM):
Σ[φ ∨M(¬φ)(ψ)] = {S[φ], S[M(¬φ)(ψ)]}
{S[φ], S[M(¬φ)(ψ)]} = {S[φ],
{
S, if DM[¬φ][ψ] meets C
〈∅,∅〉, otherwise }
In general, updating on φ ∨M(¬φ)(ψ) yields a state in which the fol-
lowing two operations are treated as alternatives: (i) incorporation of
φ, (ii) acceptance or rejection of M(¬φ)(ψ).
Characteristic states in which p∨must(¬p)(q) and p∨ ought(¬p)(q)















I offer this as a serviceable notion of ∨ for a semantics in which some
sentences (i) express tests, (ii) are embedded (with restrictions like en-
forced modal subordination) under ∨.52
52What happens when a disjunction is embedded? As before, the major prob-
lem is not with conjunction — which functions as an update-sequencer —
but with negation. I will follow Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009) in treating
negation as an alternative-flattener: a disjunction’s negation does not intro-
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4.3.3 Logic of Alternatives
Though the semantics is non-classical, it secures the core instances of
disjunctive syllogism.
Proof-sketch. Σ[φ ∨ ψ][¬φ] = (Σ[φ] ∪ Σ[ψ])[¬φ]. By Percolation, this
= Σ[φ][¬φ] ∪ Σ[ψ][¬φ]. By Percolation, Σ[φ][¬φ] = {〈∅,∅〉}. Thus,
whenever Σ[ψ][¬φ]  ψ, Σ[φ ∨ ψ][¬φ]  ψ. 
Here is a simple illustration of a state that supports p∨ q, subsequently















duce alternatives, since negations of disjunctions rule the alternatives out.
We predict this easily: by Percolation, Σ[¬(φ ∨ ψ)] = ⋃S∈Σ{S[¬(φ ∨ ψ)]}.
By Generalized Negation, this =
⋃
S∈Σ{S 	 S[φ ∨ ψ]}. When updating
a non-inquisitive state with a disjunction, Generalized Disjunction applies:⋃
S∈Σ{S	 (S[φ]unionsqS[ψ])}. This is equivalent to a classical analysis of negations
over disjunctions when φ,ψ ∈ LP — a happy result if negation flattens out
inquisitiveness in its scope. (If the appeal to Generalized Disjunction seems
ad hoc, notice that we need boring classical disjunction — i.e., a Boolean op-
eration on sets of (pairs of) points — around anyway, e.g., to handle cases
where disjunctions scope under modals.)
What about negated testy disjunctions of the form ¬(φ ∨ M(¬φ)(ψ))? Here I
am at a loss for data around which to build a theory. Embedding sentences
of the form φ ∨ M(¬φ)(ψ) under negation seems to render them defective
— try it with (22). I am inclined to stipulate away such sentences due to
defectiveness. Of course, there are perfectly acceptable sentences that seem
like they should be equivalent in meaning to such negated disjunctions (Jack
didn’t go to Alaska, and he might not have gone to Hawaii), but we have a perfectly
good story to tell about sentences of the form ¬φ ∧M(¬φ)(¬ψ).
53Why does it often seem wrong to say that φ “follows” from φ∨M(¬φ)(ψ) to-
gether with ¬M(¬φ)(ψ) (see Klinedinst and Rothschild 2012: 147; Schroeder
2011a)? I agree this is a bad inference, but I doubt it shows anything about va-
lidity (cf. Harman, 1986). (In fact, I have argued that φ ∨M(¬φ)(ψ) together
with the negation of the right disjunct is itself a contradiction.)
The semantics avoids the “core problem” with disjunction (§4.3.1).
First, disjunction introduction is invalid: disjunctions introduce robust
alternatives, so generally Σ[φ] 6= Σ[φ][φ ∨ ψ]. Second, it predicts that
φ ∨ ought(¬φ)(ψ) does imply ought(¬φ)(ψ) (similarly for must).54
Proof-sketch. Suppose Σ  φ ∨ ought(¬φ)(ψ). Then Σ = Σ[φ] ∪
Σ[ought(¬φ)(ψ)]. Consider any S ∈ Σ[φ]. Since piS(σS[¬φ]) =
piS(σS[¬φ])[ψ] = ∅, Σ[φ]  ought(¬φ)(ψ). Since Σ[ought(¬φ)(ψ)] 
ought(¬φ)(ψ), Σ  ought(¬φ)(ψ). 
As an illustration, consider the following state, which supports p ∨








It is worth noting that the support relation for this semantics is one
with, depending on your mood, modal or super-valuational (cf. Willer,
2013) content: Σ supports a non-disjunctive sentence when, for each
alternative in that state, the alternative supports the sentence.
Modal Support, 1
For non-disjunctive φ: Σ  φ iff ∀S ∈ Σ: S[φ] = S (and ∃S ∈ Σ:
S 6= 〈∅,∅〉)
54This story is somewhat simplified. I favor treating sentences with a condi-
tional meaning as introducing suppositions, à la Kaufmann (2000) (Char-
low, 2011, 2013a). So M(¬φ)(ψ) is evaluated by (a) updating the relevant
domain on ¬φ, (b) checking whether ψ is acceptable at this domain. Second,
it would be desirable to explain not only the failure of entailment, but also
the unacceptability of Σ  M(¬φ)(ψ) when Σ  φ. As noted above, domain
restrictions (e.g., in conditional antecedents) generally presuppose compati-
bility with the domain (Stalnaker, 1975; von Fintel, 1998). On this picture, φ
is strongly incompatible with M(¬φ)(ψ).
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The analogy to modality is evocative: an alternative’s membership in a
state is analogous to its accessibility. Indeed, it is natural to introduce
some novel modalities — a necessity modality [A] and, more interest-
ingly, a related possibility modality 〈A〉 — that pick up on the modal
import of .
Modal Support, 2
Σ  [A]φ iff ∀S ∈ Σ: S[φ] = S (and ∃S ∈ Σ: S 6= 〈∅,∅〉)
Σ  〈A〉φ iff ∃S ∈ Σ : S[φ] = S (and S 6= 〈∅,∅〉)
These modalities are interesting for two reasons. First, they illustrate
vividly that it remains possible to derive formal contradictions by way
of accounting for object-language inconsistencies between sentences
expressing tests.55
Proof. Suppose Σ  M(φ)(ψ) and Σ  ¬M(φ)(ψ). Then
Σ  [A]M(φ)(ψ) and Σ  [A]¬M(φ)(ψ). Hence Σ  [A]M(φ)(ψ) and
Σ  ¬〈A〉M(φ)(ψ). Contradiction.
The crucial move from Σ  [A]¬M(φ)(ψ) to Σ  ¬〈A〉M(φ)(ψ) is li-
censed by an earlier result that there is (on pain of contradiction) no
S such that S  ¬M(φ)(ψ) and S  M(φ)(ψ). Access to canonical ac-
counts of object-language inconsistency does not depend on supposing
that the sentence or its negation expresses a proposition — something
that remains true when states are understood inquisitively.
The modality 〈A〉 is interesting for another reason: with some mi-
nor tweaks to the test semantics for epistemic and deontic modals,
55For sentences that do not contain tests — even disjunctions — inconsistency is
fully standard. The inconsistency between, e.g., (p∨ q) and ¬(p∨ q) reduces
to ordinary possible-worlds inconsistency. Suppose that Σ  (p ∨ q) and
Σ  ¬(p ∨ q). Then Σ = Σ[p] ∪ Σ[q] and Σ = ⋃S∈Σ{S	 S[p ∨ q]}. Then for
S ∈ Σ: S  p or S  q, and (by applying Generalized Disjunction; cf. fn52)
S  ¬p and S  ¬q. These conditions on S can be shown to be classically
inconsistent using the technique of §3.4.
free-choice entailments come for free (for some detail, see Charlow,
2011, §4.4.6). Recall (19) and (21), repeated here:
(32) It might rain or it might snow⇒ It might rain
(33) You may have an apple or have a pear⇒ You may have a pear
On the dynamic alternative semantics for disjunction we have given,
successful update on it might rain or it might snow yields a state
Σ in which it might rain and it might snow are alternatives. Hence
Σ  〈A〉might(rain) and Σ  〈A〉might(snow). Similarly, a state Σ′ that
has been successfully updated with you may have an apple or have a pear
is such that Σ′  〈A〉may(apple) and Σ′  〈A〉may(pear). To secure the
desired entailments, it would suffice to ensure that the following hold:
• If Σ  〈A〉might(φ) then Σ  might(φ)
• If Σ  〈A〉may(φ) then Σ  may(φ)
These things follow if possibility modals test, not for compatibility
with every alternative, instead for compatibility with some alternative
— if, in other words, possibility modals behave like stacked existential
quantifiers (∃∃).56 Should we wish to change the semantics in this way,
the needed revisions are simple. For example:
56The duals of possibility modals thus have a supervaluational semantics
(≈ ∀∀), as in Willer (2013). Contra Willer, possibility modals have a “sub-
valuational” (≈ ∃∃) rather than supervaluational (≈ ∀∃) semantics. Willer’s
approach is handy if one objects to the fact that updating on a test never
itself changes a state: for Willer, a possibility modality eliminates from a state
any member that does not support it, yielding a state in which each member
supports the possibility modality (hence a state that supports the supervalu-
ational possibility modality). I think this is thin motivation for a Willer-style
semantics over my own: a non-eliminative pragmatics makes good sense, as
I will argue in the next section. How the accounts compare on other dimen-
sions is a further question. I would briefly suggest that the desire to associate
sentences semantically with definite updates rather than broad cognitive di-
rectives tends to result from a questionable impulse to write answers to epis-
temological questions about rational attitude-revision into one’s semantics
(more on this below). Thanks here to one of my referees.
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Subvaluational Restricted Dynamic might
Σ[might(φ)(ψ)] =
{
Σ, if ∃S ∈ Σ : σS[φ][ψ] 6= ∅
{〈∅,∅〉}, otherwise
Note: this will mean that some non-disjunctive updates — in particular,
updates on modals — do not percolate throughout the alternatives, but
rather test for global features of inquisitive states. I think there are solid
reasons to revise the semantics for possibility modals in this way. But
I will remain officially neutral on this here.57
57The gist, in two slogans: a permitted permission is just a permission; a pos-
sible possibility is just a possibility. This is similar in motivation to the treat-
ment of free-choice effects proposed by Zimmermann (2000). It is interesting
to note that disjunctions of necessity modals are, as promised in fn42, pre-
dicted to be defective in this framework. Notice first: must(φ)(ψ) will test Σ
for the following property: for each S ∈ Σ, σS[φ][ψ] = σS[φ]. Notice further:
Σ updated with must(p) ∨must(¬p)(q) will treat as alternatives tests for the
following conditions: (i) for each S ∈ Σ: σS[p] = σS, (ii) for each S ∈ Σ:
σS[¬p][q] = σS[¬p]. If Σ satisfies (i), then it satisfies (ii) but only due to re-
jection of the right modal’s restriction (thus rendering the modal subject to
presupposition failure). If Σ satisfies (ii), then it satisfies (i) only if Σ = {∅}.
Any state other than {∅} must therefore positively reject at least one disjunct
of must(p)∨must(¬p)(q). Disjunctions with this property — e.g. disjunctions
whose left disjunct presupposes p and whose right disjunct presupposes ¬p
— are generally defective. (As an example: #John realizes that the keys are on
the table or he realizes that the keys are not on the table.)
5. Expressivist Metasemantics and Pragmatics
The semantics of §4 differs from standard Expressivist semantics in de-
clining to treat the meaning of E-sentences in terms of their contents
(with contents understood as objects at least as fine-grained as sets of
objects that behave disquotationally with respect to the connectives).
Nevertheless, it manages to achieve canonical (if not classical) explana-
tions of a fair range of facts. I think this is reason for Expressivists to
be interested in this sort of semantics (and the general strategy it ex-
emplifies). Perhaps it is also reason to acknowledge that seduction by
the techniques of standard truth-conditional semantics has thwarted
Expressivists’ theoretical ambitions in both linguistics and the philoso-
phy of language.
There is a further question about the semantics to which I have
alluded: Is the Expressivist entitled to make use of it? Is it compati-
ble with her core theoretical commitments? At first blush, the answer
seems yes. Recall the characterization of Expressivism from §2. Ex-
pressivism’s key claims are metasemantic (to explain an E-sentence’s
meaning, explain its function — specifically, what state of mind it is
used to express) and empirical (the function of the sentence is non-
representational). Together these claims commit the Expressivist to a
nonpropositional semantics for E-sentences. The sort of semantics for
epistemic and deontic modals I have described is nonpropositional. It
seems to assign them a non-representational function. And states of
mind seem to be playing a fairly central role in the theory: we evaluate
sentences relative to formal representations of attitudes.
5.1 A Wrinkle
Note, however, that psychological concreta appear nowhere in the seman-
tics I have sketched. States are set-theoretic constructions out of possi-
bilia. The semantics is, then, not obviously Psychologistic in Rosen’s
sense (cf. §2): it does not map sentences “to the mental states they ‘ex-
press’ when uttered sincerely”. Nor does it map sentences to contents
that indirectly individuate the mental states those sentences express
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when uttered sincerely (i.e., for each content, the mental state of ac-
cepting that content).
Nevertheless: the objects of semantic evaluation are obviously
meant to represent states of mind. For instance, I have suggested that








Since such representations are non-mental, it is actually not clear what
theoretical role they are supposed to play. We defined Expressivism as
a view on which states of mind are fundamental in the theory of mean-
ing. If our objects of semantic evaluation are non-mental, then it looks
like our semantic theory, like Gibbard’s Boolean Hyperplan Semantics,
is just a collection of formally tractable heuristics for thinking about
what is going on in the actually fundamental, psychological model
theory. Further: on most (though, as I explain below, not all) interpre-
tations of Expressivism, it is committed to a distinctively Expressivist
semantics. No semantics of possibilia is proprietary to any particular
theory of meaning: it is easy to imagine a (e.g.) Relativist spin on the
relevant formal machinery (cf. Dreier, 1999; Silk, 2013). The “true” Ex-
pressivist semantics is Psychologistic. The semantic theory we have
stated looks to have a wholly heuristic function.
It is, as ever, a live question whether the semantic theory is a good
heuristic for thinking about what is going on in the fundamental model
theory: is, e.g., the inconsistency we observe when we derive a con-
tradiction in the semantic metalanguage (the one making use of pos-
sibilia) matched by a corresponding inconsistency in the attitudes ex-
pressed by the apparently contradictory sentences? Recall that Gibbard
was able to derive contradictions in the semantic metalanguage by sup-
posing that (i) Hyperplans behaved disquotationally, (ii) negation ex-
pressed Boolean complementation; from this it followed immediately
that, e.g., supposing that Jought(φ)K ∩ J¬ought(φ)K 6= ∅ meant being
able to derive a contradiction. But we faulted Gibbard for taking this
to explain the inconsistency of ought(φ) and ¬ought(φ), since it did
not tell us what was inconsistent about the attitudes these sentences
expressed. Although we have carefully avoided making use of dis-
quotation, isn’t our own semantics, when viewed as part of a broader
Expressivist theory, in exactly this situation? Formal contradictions in
a metalanguage that is taken to represent the relevant psychological
facts are a poor substitute for a properly psychological account of the
relevant inconsistencies (particularly if we take seriously the idea that
there is no such account to be had).
The rest of this section pushes back against these claims.58 My key
contention is that endorsing the metasemantic and empirical claims
that are definitive of Expressivism does not commit one to endorsing a
Psychologistic Semantics — or, indeed, to thinking that any fundamen-
tal semantic notions need to be given a psychological account. I do not
think there is any such account to be had, for the reasons given in §3 (and
more besides): psychological states are not endowed with the sorts of
characteristics that would allow them to underwrite properly canonical
accounts of inconsistency, validity, and so forth. Rather, the metaseman-
tic and empirical claims that are definitive of Expressivism only require
the Expressivist to assign a semantic value to an E-sentence that, when
embedded in a pragmatic theory linking semantic values to character-
istic functions, encodes that sentence’s characteristic function. To meet
this demand, the semantic theory must be non-propositional, but it
need not be Psychologistic. It can, in principle, be used by a variety of
58I give a sketch of the sort of picture I defend here in Charlow (2014c). Yal-
cin (2012) has a similar take on the relationship between semantics and use:
“knowledge of the compositional semantic value of the sentence, together
with any standing mutually known pragmatic norms and relevant facts of
context, must be sufficient to determine” the property of information states
determined by the semantics (142). The “Constraint Semantics” of Swanson
(forthcoming) is another key antecedent for this view.
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accounts of the meaning of the relevant sentence; a noncommittal se-
mantic theory, in a sense, can (within certain limits) become Expressivist
when couched in the right kind of pragmatics.
This is not to say that I think there is no Expressivist-friendly ac-
count to be given of the inconsistency of, e.g., the attitudes expressed
by ought(p) and ¬ought(p) — or, more carefully, of the irrationality of
having these attitudes together. When married to an account linking
the semantic value of a sentence to its pragmatic profile, this irrational-
ity can be given a fairly straightforward account: roughly, acceptance
of ought(p) is inconsistent with acceptance of ¬ought(p) because the
sentential objects of these attitudes express inconsistent conditions on
a representation of a state of mind. (Roughly: ought(p) expresses the
condition of having preferences representable in such a way that every
preferred world is a p-world, while ¬ought(p) expresses the condition
of having preferences representable in such a way that some preferred
world is a p-world.) Crucially, however, as we have seen, this irrational-
ity is not used to do any work in accounting for any fundamental semantic
notions. I will say more on the attitudes shortly.
5.2 Semantics and Metasemantics
Endorsing an Expressivist metasemantics, on which states of mind are
fundamental in a theory of meaning, does not commit the Expressivist
to a Psychologistic Semantics.59 To show this, it suffices to describe
a coherent kind of theory in which states of mind are recognizably
fundamental in the theory of meaning, but in which states of mind do
no explanatory work within the semantic theory.
This is not difficult (cf. Charlow, 2014c). A familiar notion of funda-
mentality allows domain D to be explanatorily fundamental, without
requiring that explanations within non-fundamental domains reduce to
59This sort of claim is becoming common: see Chrisman (2012b); Yalcin (2012);
Silk (2013); Ridge (2014); Charlow (2014c). Though there are major differ-
ences in this camp, all take Expressivism primarily to be a metasemantic-
cum-pragmatic, rather than semantic, thesis about E-sentences.
explanations within D. A distinction like this is commonly used to dis-
tinguish Reductive from non-Reductive forms of Physicalism. Being
a Physicalist does not require being a reductionist (or, otherwise, an
instrumentalist or error theorist) about explanations within a special
science like biology or psychology. Instead, it requires only the superve-
nience — better, dependence — of phenomena within a non-fundamental
domain on phenomena within the physical domain.
I have not yet given a pragmatic account that links a sentence’s
characteristic function to its semantic value in the desired way. (I will
shortly.) But supposing such an account is viable, it seems possible
to hold that a sentence’s semantic value depends on its characteristic
function (hence that the latter is fundamental), without thereby hold-
ing that explanations within the special science of semantics reduce to
explanations within the theory of its characteristic function. This latter
commitment, in fact, is to be avoided.
How might a sentence’s semantic value depend on its character-
istic function? Here I have something relatively specific in mind: to
know a sentence’s semantic value is to be in a position to know which
state of mind is constitutively involved in the acceptance of that sen-
tence (hence to know what state of mind one must come to instantiate,
should she come to accept the sentence). The sentence’s semantic value
thus depends on the state of mind constitutively involved in the accep-
tance of that sentence.
5.3 Pragmatics and Cognitive Directives
The test semantics of §4 declines to specify what an agent learns — how
her state of mind changes — when she comes to accept a modal.60
60I here part ways with Willer (2013). Willer — translating from his system into
mine — suggests that (i) update on might(p) percolates a test throughout
Σ, (ii) for any S ∈ Σ that fails the test, S is eliminated in Σ[might(p)], i.e.,
Σ[might(p)] = Σ− {S : S[might(p)] = 〈∅,∅〉} (2013: 57–8). I have no view
about what to do with a component state S ∈ Σ when S fails a test percolated
throughout Σ. As I will note, I am uncomfortable with writing such a rule
— effectively a belief-revision rule — into the semantics of modals. (Note: I
officially prefer a treatment of modality on which modals test Σ rather than
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Though she surely learns something, the semantics is mum about what.
The only change a test can yield is catastrophic. Insofar as pragmatics is
in the business of relating an utterance to a proposed change (to a
context, state of mind, etc.), it may seem difficult to give any sort of
intelligible pragmatics for the test semantics we’ve suggested.
This is incorrect, but for an interesting reason. Consider an utter-
ance of might(φ) that is accepted. There are two cases: (i) the prior
information is compatible with φ, (ii) it is not. The latter is the central
case — if the relevant domain already passes the relevant test, then it is
not clear that one learns anything when one updates on the associated
modal.61 So let us consider it. Presumably the relevant change involves
making φ compatible with the information. This means expanding the
information space, by adding at least one world to at least one of the al-
ternatives that are considered live, thereby giving up some information
components of Σ, as in §4.3.3.)
61What of the often-noted difference between (34a) and (34b) — one naturally
glossed as coming to realize that might(¬φ)?
(34) a. Not thinking that must(φ)
b. Thinking that ¬must(φ)
My view is that (i) the distinction here is analogous to the weak/strong per-
mission distinction (Anderson, 1966), (ii) this is a side-issue in the semantics
of modals. Unsurprisingly, a test semantics on which modals are evaluated
relative to unstructured domains — sets of possible worlds — cannot repre-
sent this distinction (see Yalcin, 2011). To remedy this, Yalcin enriches infor-
mation spaces to represent the condition of treating something as an issue.
(34a) says the subject’s information is compatible with ¬φ, while (34b) says
this, plus that the subject treats the question ?φ as a live issue. So long as
we (i) imbue our representation of the relevant domain with this sort of ad-
ditional structure, (ii) make the support relation for modals is sensitive to
such structure, we can represent the difference between a state characterized
with (34a) and one characterized with (34b). So long as support for a modal
(and negated modal) still entails that the desired quantificational condition
on the relevant domain is met, a quantificational account of the inconsistency
between a modal and its negation is not threatened. For an application of Yal-
cin’s idea to deontic modals, see Charlow (2011, §4.3.8). For an alternative,
supervaluational approach to distinguishing between failure to support an
epistemic modal and support for its negation, see Willer (2013). An idea akin
to Willer’s is taken up for deontic modals in Silk (2015).
previously taken for granted. In other words, the information must be
revised in some way — a way that is presumably conservative with
respect to its priors.
How, exactly, this revision will or ought to proceed is a topic for
epistemology. There is no reason for the semantics or pragmatics for
modals to address it (Veltman 1996, 229; Charlow 2014a, §5.6.2; Char-
low forthcoming). Here, I would note only that writing substantive
theories of attitude revision into an update function will effectively
make any such theory a theorem of the semantics, precluding the possi-
bility of semantically competent disagreement about the nature of the
correct theory of rational attitude revision (see Charlow, forthcoming).
The semantics and pragmatics’ job is to furnish a theory associating
sentences with cognitive directives — the directive to be in the state of
accepting that sentence, supplemented with an account of what sort of
state is involved in the acceptance of that sentence. The epistemologist
subsequently furnishes a substantive theory of diachronic compliance
for these directives.
5.3.1 Coordination via Approximation
What is the specific directive associated with a test-expressing sen-
tence? To answer this question, we need a general account linking
semantic values to cognitive directives: a pragmatics. Such a pragmat-
ics might, at first, seem trivial. First, notice that the dynamic semantic
value of any sentence corresponds directly to a property of states: the
property a state has just if it supports that sentence. If |φ| notates the
property of states associated with a sentence φ, then:
|φ| = λΣ . Σ  φ
Given this, it would be natural to endorse the following pragmatics
(for authors that do endorse something like this pragmatics, see Yalcin,
2012; Swanson, forthcoming):
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Coordination Pragmatics
An utterance of φ by S to A is normally interpreted as a proposal
by S that A psychologically approximate |φ|
Psychological Approximation
A psychologically approximates |φ| iff ∃Σ ∈ |φ|: A is repre-
sentable with Σ
I assume, for now, that the relevant features of an agent’s state of
mind are representable with inquisitive states (which are interpreted
constructions out of possibilia). I also assume that agents have a tacit
grasp of the relationship between our interpreted constructions out
of possibilia and the psychological states that they serve to represent,
in the following sense: in computing the semantic value for φ (and
thereby computing |φ|), a competent agent is thereby able to come to
know what state of mind approximates |φ|. For this to be so, there
must of course be a regular relationship between entities like |φ| and
states of mind that approximate them. I have been implicitly relying
on features of this relationship in §4. I will now be explicit about what
I take the relationship to be.
Representation
1. 〈σ,pi(σ)〉 represents the state of mind of A wherein:
(a) w ∈ σ iff it is compatible with A’s information that she is
in w
(b) w ∈ pi(σ) iff it is compatible with A’s preferences (given
σ) that she is in w
2. Σ represents A iff (i) for each non-absurd S ∈ Σ, A regards
the state of mind represented by S as an alternative for what
to think, (ii) for no S′ /∈ Σ, A regards the state of mind repre-
sented by S′ as an alternative for what to think
3. |φ| represents the psychological property Ψ such that Σ ∈ |φ|
iff Σ represents the state of an agent A of satisfying Ψ
For example, |p| represents the psychological property Ψ such that
Σ ∈ |p| iff Σ represents the state of an agent satisfying Ψ. Ψ, then, is
the property of self-locating in a p-world. More interestingly, |p ∨ q|
represents the psychological property Ψ such that Σ ∈ |p ∨ q| iff Σ
represents the state of an agent satisfying Ψ. Ψ, then, is the property
of treating acceptance of p and acceptance of q as alternatives for what
to think.
Approximation works up from component states to sets of such
states (inquisitive states) to sets of inquisitive states (i.e., full-blown
psychological properties). Here is an illustration. Below, the left state
represents a state of A wherein A accepts p, i.e., A’s information locates
her in a p-world; the right state represents the state of A wherein A
accepts ought(¬p)(q), i.e., A’s preferences (given ¬p) are such that she









The following inquisitive state represents the state of A wherein A
accepts p∨ ought(¬p)(q), i.e., treats p and ought(¬p)(q) as alternatives








Finally, the set of all such inquisitive states — the set of all inquisitive
states in which p and ought(¬p)(q) are treated as alternatives for what
to think — gives |p ∨ ought(¬p)(q)|.
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Approximation might at step (ii) seem to appeal to a questionable
attitude — the attitude of treating something as an alternative for ac-
ceptance. In a sense, yes: so-described, this is probably not one of the
stock attitudes of folk psychology. But we have good reason for think-
ing there are such attitudes. They are the sorts of attitudes generally
thought — on fairly standard semantics for questions embedded under
attitudes — to be attributed by ascriptions like (35–36):
(35) Sally wondered whether the play began at 9pm or at 10pm
(36) Sally wondered whether to have the red or to have the white
And if an inquisitive account of disjunction is correct — a claim with
some empirical plausibility — they are also the sorts of attitudes at-
tributed by ascriptions like (37–38):
(37) Sally thought the play began either at 9pm or at 10pm
(38) Sally decided to have the red or to have the white
Approximation plays a theoretical function (here, in the pragmatics)
that is roughly analogous to IPR. But it differs from IPR in individuat-
ing a state of mind (e.g., accepting φ) directly — by simply reading off
the psychological property represented by each member of |φ|. It thus
appears to sidestep at least one of the Type 2 worries associated with
the content-centric forms of Expressivism (§3.3).
It is natural to wonder if it sidesteps them all. Recall the objection
to Gibbard’s explanation of inconsistency between, e.g., ought(p) and
its negation. Gibbard explains this by appeal to the fact that, on his
semantics, Jought(p)K ∩ J¬ought(p)K = ∅. But a Hyperplanner who
thinks p required and ¬p permitted seems possible, in which case the
semantics would appear to be representing a rational ideal without
giving any account of it. Are we not in the same situation? It is true
that, on our semantics, |ought(p)| ∩ |¬ought(p)| = ∅. But the state that
|ought(p)| ∩ |¬ought(p)| represents is possible, so our semantics too
would appear to be representing a rational ideal while still failing to
account for it.
Unlike Gibbard’s account of the inconsistency of these sentences,
however, ours has nothing to do with the notion that |ought(p)| ∩
|¬ought(p)| represents an inconsistent state of mind. It has to do with
the fact that these sentences enforce logically incompatible conditions
on semantic objects of evaluation (i.e., states). States of mind do not fig-
ure in semantic explanation in our theory. Rather, they determine the
semantic values that do figure in semantic explanation in our theory:
the semantic theory is designed to assign to sentences semantic val-
ues that, in conjunction with Approximation, correctly individuate the
states of mind those sentences conventionally express. Semantics is de-
pendent on states of mind, but semantic explanations are sui generis.
There remain some questions here — in particular concerning the de-
tachability of this part of the account from the semantics of §4. I will
postpone these for the moment.
5.3.2 Against Coordination
Why “coordination” pragmatics? It is natural to understand |φ|’s psy-
chological approximation as the state of mind a speaker expresses when
she utters φ. Putting the pieces together, an utterance of φ by a speaker
S to addressee A is normally interpreted as a proposal by S that A and
S coordinate on the state of mind S expresses in uttering φ. Note that
Coordination Pragmatics manages to associate sentences that express
tests with non-trivial directives to update one’s state of mind, in spite of
the fact that the semantics expressly does not. Epistemology then fur-
nishes an account of how best to comply with these directives, given
some description of an agent’s prior state.
Coordination via Approximation is a natural picture, and I have
tried to elaborate and defend it at some length here. Nevertheless I ul-
timately think it is the wrong one. It does not cut things finely enough.
There are a couple of different ways to appreciate this.
First, an imperative of the form !φ (read: see to it that φ) is plausi-
bly interpreted as a proposal that the spheres of permissibility com-
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patible with a state come to contain only φ-worlds — or, more gener-
ally, that the spheres of permissibility compatible with a state come
to require that φ (for references that endorse roughly this picture
for imperatives, see Lewis, 1979b; Portner, 2007; Starr, forthcomingb;
Charlow, 2011, 2014a,b). But then the states that support an imper-
ative !φ are exactly those that support a corresponding deontic modal
ought(φ). In my view, this is the correct result; these states are the same:
|!φ| = |ought(φ)| (Charlow, 2013a). But according to Coordination Prag-
matics, it follows from this that imperatives and their corresponding
deontic modals receive the same interpretations: both are interpreted
as proposals by a speaker that the addressee approximate the property
of requiring their common prejacent.62 That is as wrong as could be.
Deontic modals are suited for many things that imperatives are not:
they are evaluable for truth and apt for assertion. Imperatives are neither.
Second, notice that, when φ is propositional, an epistemic necessity
claim of the form must(φ) and the bare prejacent φ are also supported
by the same states, namely, those states such that updating on φ is
redundant. In my view, this is the correct result: a state that accepts
φ accepts must(φ), and vice versa; |φ| = |must(φ)| (cf. von Fintel and
Gillies, 2010). According to Coordination Pragmatics, it follows that
they receive the same interpretations: both are interpreted as proposals
by a speaker that the addressee approximate the property of accepting
φ. This, too, I find objectionable (though for different reasons). Uttering
φ normally asserts that φ, while uttering must(φ) normally does not;
rather, it offers some sort of non-assertive comment on the proposition
that φ or one’s evidence for φ (cf. Swanson, 2005; von Fintel and Gillies,
62Also potentially worrying: it is clearly not the case that a speaker who utters
an imperative !φ proposes to coordinate with her addressee on the property
of requiring φ. Coordination on planning, at least in the most obvious sense
of that notion, is clearly not the point of an utterance of an imperative; it is
to change the plans or goals of the addressee. I’ll sidestep this, by supposing
there is an extended sense of coordination, such that a speaker who utters
!φ and an addressee who comes to regard φ as required are coordinated
regarding their views about the desirability of the state of affairs in which
the addressee sees to it that φ.
2007). In spite of this, the epistemic modal is clearly evaluable for truth,
and it does function to assert; must(φ) is not, however, evaluated for
truth in the way that φ is evaluated for truth, and it does not function
to assert in the same manner that φ functions to assert.
5.3.3 Stage-Setting
Accommodating such distinctions means the pragmatics must recog-
nize the difference between enforcing property Φ on a state (or compo-
nent state) — the sort of operation performed by an imperative and
utterance of a bare proposition-expressing sentence — and checking
the state for the presence of Φ — the sort of operation performed by
deontic and epistemic necessity modals.
There is a relatively clear sense in which test-expressing sentences
are evaluable for truth. We have been understanding tests as updates
on states, but we might just as easily have understood them as queries
concerning the features of a state, such that a positive response to the
query amounts to a judgment of truth, a negative response to a judg-
ment of falsity. When φ expresses a test, the idea is that Σ[φ] can be
understood to give, instead of the update of Σ on φ, rather a judg-
ment regarding the truth (if Σ passes) or falsity (if Σ fails) of φ.63 This
suggests an enrichment of Coordination Pragmatics:
Enriched Coordination Pragmatics
1. If [φ] is not a query, an utterance of φ by S to A is normally
interpreted as a proposal by S that A approximate |φ|
2. If [φ] is a query Qu(|φ|), then:
63To remain neutral on questions left open in §4.3.3, I here understand the
notion of a test in an extended sense, so that updates that percolate a test
throughout a state count as tests, express queries, and so on. A referee notes
that the proposal here does not really fully explain why sentences express-
ing tests are evaluable for truth (beyond gesturing at a querying metaphor);
rather, it begins with classes of obviously truth-evaluable and obviously non-
truth-evaluable sentences and reverse engineers a semantic criterion that
sorts them correctly. I would agree that it is important to do better here.
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(a) An utterance of φ by S to A is normally interpreted as
an invitation by A to agree (if A approximates |φ|) or dis-
agree (otherwise)
(b) If A disagrees with S, then S’s utterance is normally inter-
preted as a proposal by S that A approximate P
According to Enriched Coordination Pragmatics, imperatives and cor-
responding deontic modals have the same upshot: both tend to yield
coordination on the common cognitive feature expressed by each sen-
tence. But individuating the speech act expressed by a sentence accord-
ing to its characteristic upshot cuts things too coarsely. Some moves in
a conversation are (what we might call) stage-setting moves: they set the
stage for subsequent coordination, rather than proposing it directly.
Although this is speculative, it is perhaps not hard to imagine why
stage-setting moves would be part of the conversational moves avail-
able to speakers of a natural language. A speaker may lack direct evi-
dence for a proposition that is nevertheless entailed by her evidence, in
which case she may want to set the stage for negotiation about the ad-
dressee’s acceptance of that proposition by first inviting her addressee
to agree or disagree about that proposition’s truth (cf. von Fintel and
Gillies, 2007). Or a speaker may wish to avoid the presumption of au-
thority that goes along with the issuance of an out-and-out command,
instead setting the stage for conversational negotiation about her ad-
dressee’s adoption of a certain plan or goal by first inviting her ad-
dressee to agree or disagree about the desirability of that plan or goal.
On the view of the semantic-pragmatic interface suggested here,
there is a robust pragmatic difference — matching, on our account, a
robust semantic difference — between, on the one hand, utterances of
epistemic and deontic modals and, on the other hand, utterances of
bare propositions and imperatives.64 Further, these differences seem to
64Since evaluability for truth is not just a syntactic feature of a sentence — it
is, rather, grounded in its semantic and pragmatic profile — the account also
seems well-suited to dealing with Dreier’s Hiyo problem (Dreier, 1996).
at least offer the hope of making sense of the platitude that epistemic
and deontic modals are evaluable for truth (hence go in for assertion).
5.4 Fundamentality
So far we have (i) a general argument for the possibility of a theory of
meaning in which a sentence’s semantic value depends on its charac-
teristic function (§5.2), and (ii) an account of the pragmatic profile of
sentences that have tests as their semantic values (§5.3). In what sense
might the semantic values of sentences that express tests be dependent
on their pragmatic profiles?
Here I can imagine various things someone with Expressivist sym-
pathies might naturally say. I will say only one. (Someone without
those same sympathies is, I stress, free to say none.) The primary job
of the semantic theory for a sentence is to encode that sentence’s prag-
matic profile. The primary characteristic of a sentence φ’s pragmatic
profile is the state of mind it engenders coordination around — the
state of mind we might say it expresses. The semantics of §4 encodes
this as |φ|. A secondary characteristic of a sentence’s pragmatic pro-
file is the manner in which it normally expresses this state of mind,
whether by directly proposing coordination around that state of mind
(as with bare propositions or imperatives) or by setting the stage for
negotiation between speaker and addressee about whether to coordi-
nate around that state of mind (as with modals). The semantics of §4
encodes this too, at the level of the type of update function assigned by
[·] to φ: a non-querying intersective update (bare propositions and im-
peratives) or a querying non-intersective update, i.e., a test (modals).65
65Someone with Expressivist sympathies might cite the ability of a test seman-
tics to make these sorts of fine-grained distinctions between the pragmatic
profiles of, e.g., imperatives and deontic modals as a motivation for the test
semantics. Conversely, someone, like Veltman, who cites the ability of a test
semantics to make these sorts of fine-grained distinctions as a motivation for
the test semantics (cf. §4.1) is arguably betraying evidence of Expressivist
sympathies (since they would be evincing a commitment to the idea that the
primary job of the semantic theory for a sentence is to encode that sentence’s
pragmatic profile).
philosophers’ imprint - 37 - vol. 15, no. 23 (august 2015)
nate charlow Prospects for an Expressivist Theory of Meaning
As I mentioned, there remains a question about the detachability
of the account I have sketched in this section from the semantics of
§4. Consider a broadly “static” or “truth-conditional” version of this
semantics that — rather than assigning sentences updates as semantic
values — evaluated sentences as follows (cf. Yalcin, 2007, 2011, 2012;
Klinedinst and Rothschild, 2012; Rothschild and Yalcin, forthcoming):
Staticized Dynamic Semantics
1. JpKw,Σ = 1 iff p ∈ w
2. J¬φKw,Σ = 1 iff JφKw,Σ 6= 1
3. Jφ ∧ ψKw,Σ = 1 iff JφKw,Σ = JψKw,Σ[φ] = 1
4. Jφ ∨ ψKw,Σ = 1 iff JφKw,Σ = 1 or JψKw,Σ[¬φ] = 1
5. JM(φ)(ψ)Kw,Σ = 1 iff Σ  M(φ)(ψ) ( as defined above)
On such an account, acceptance of φ is naturally individuated, not
via |φ|, rather via JφK = {〈w,Σ〉 : JφKw,Σ = 1}.66 This style of Expres-
sivism is, thus, broadly traditional in its individuation of attitudes by
way of contents — sets of pairs of type 〈w,Σ〉 that behave disquotation-
ally with respect to the connectives — via, one would guess, IPR. It is
non-traditional in taking (at least potentially) the role these contents
play in semantic explanation to be sui generis: Expressivism’s distinct-
ness is taken to lie not in psychologistic explanations of semantic phe-
nomena, rather in grounding its account of a sentence’s semantics in
primary and secondary characteristics of its pragmatic profile.
Does this blend of traditional (Content Expressivism) with non-
traditional (non-Psychologism) pass muster? No. Individuating atti-
tides in this way, via IPR (and a broadly Hintikkan understanding of
66Or, a truth-conditional account can individuate acceptance of φ with |φ|, as
defined in Approximation. (Note that this means giving up the disquota-
tional clauses here. For example, Clause (iv) needs to be replaced with a
Σ-sensitive semantics for disjunction: Jφ ∨ ψKw,Σ = 1 iff Σ  φ ∨ ψ, as de-
fined above.) This is quite close — approaching notational variance — to the
view I’ve stated. Notice, however, that it will be hard to represent a distinc-
tion in meaning between imperatives and deontic necessity modals without
distinguishing between different ways of updating a state.
the relevant attitude), whether via the relatively less-sophisticated se-
mantics of §3.3, or the state-based semantics of §4, is just an explanatory
dead-end. To flesh this out: Schroeder has objected to Expressivistic the-
ories of meaning because the meanings their semantic theories assign
to sentences outrun any corresponding psychologistic interpretation.
[O]nce we take the expressivist plunge and hold that believing that P
and believing that Q are two quite different kinds of state of mind, no
formal trick gets us off the hook for saying what it is to believe that
P ∨Q. Plausibly, it can’t be just the same kind of state as believing
that P, and it can’t be just the same kind of state as believing that
Q. But as we’ve seen, it can’t just be the state of either believing
that P or believing that Q, either... Saying what this state is, is a
philosophical problem [for the Expressivist]. (2011a: 14)
I see no way for Content Expressivism to give a constructive story
about the states of mind living at the theory’s fundamental level. The
version of the theory considered here does improve on the one cri-
tiqued in §3: it does not insist that semantic explanations be given
in (or reducible to explanations within) a psychological model theory.
But, so long as attitude-individuation goes by way of IPR, the charac-
teristics of the psychological entities living at the theory’s fundamental
level remains obscure (see §3).
By contrast, the view I have defended does give a constructive story
about the nature of the states of mind living at the theory’s funda-
mental level: given a sentence φ, it is the psychological state Ψ such
that Σ ∈ |φ| iff Σ represents a state of an agent A wherein A satis-
fies Ψ (where this is in turn understood via Approximation). Speak-
ing roughly, it is the psychological characteristic that all and only the
members of |φ| represent. A similar strategy fails for the Content Expres-
sivist. On pain of identifying the wrong psychological characteristic,
the Content Expressivist cannot say that the psychological characteris-
tic extracted from the members of Jφ ∨ ψK = {〈w,Σ〉 : JφKw,Σ = 1 orJψKw,Σ[¬φ] = 1} is the psychological characteristic that all and only
those members share, i.e., accepting φ or ψ (given ¬φ) (see §4.3.1).
Nor can she say that the psychological characteristic extracted from
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the members of J¬φK = {〈w,Σ〉 : JφKw,Σ 6= 1} is the psychological
characteristic that exactly those members share, i.e., failing to accept φ.
There is more to be said — in particular, about the nature of an
attitude like treating {A1, ..., An} as alternatives. Here I have not said
much, beyond relying on our intuitive understanding of attributions of
inquisitive states of mind. This is a topic ripe for work in the philoso-
phy of mind and natural language semantics (for a promising start, see
Friedman, 2013). For now, though, I would say this: in divorcing the
semantic theory for a sentence φ from the (fundamental) theory of φ’s
pragmatic profile, we free ourselves to explore φ’s semantic character-
istics in the absence of a complete (or even well-understood) account
of φ’s pragmatic profile (in particular, of the state of mind that approx-
imates |φ|). Similarly, given a commitment to non-reductive physical-
ism, evolutionary biologists can ply their trade with a clear conscience,
even in the absence of any account (or, indeed, understanding) of the
physical correlates of the phenomena in which they are interested.
In the course of semantic theorizing, Expressivists, of course, incur
psychological commitments (to the existence of corresponding psycho-
logical states) that, if false, would render Expressivism about the target
fragment unacceptable. Expressivists, for instance, are committed to
the existence of the state of mind accepting a mixed disjunction (and,
moreover, to the notion that this state of mind cannot be fully under-
stood as the attitude of acceptance toward a proposition — that the
state of mind is not representational). Expressivists should take care,
then, that their semantics (and their understanding of the semantics-
pragmatics interface) is not leading them to incur evidently absurd
psychological commitments. But Expressivists, qua semantic theorists,
are under no obligation to vindicate these psychological commitments
in order to be productive participants in natural language semantics.
Insofar as Expressivists can credibly claim to be opening up new vis-
tas in semantic theorizing — something that seems increasingly to be
the case — their psychological commitments should be regarded with
some indulgence. A semantics, whether Expressivist or not, should be
judged in the way a semantics is always judged: according to (and only
according to) its predictions about the semantic profile of sentences of
the target fragment. Expressivists who heed this paper’s advice should
be welcomed into the fold of natural language semantics.
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